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COMMENTS
Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the
Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector
In recent years, a number of states have enacted legislation providing collective bargaining rights for public employees. 1 Almost
invariably these statutes have reaffirmed the traditional prohibition
against strikes by government workers. 2 But the strike-or the
threat of a strike-has been a key economic weapon for employees
in the private sector, and some observers contend that without that
weapon the new collective bargaining rights for public employees
are illusory.3
·
Because of the inherent conflict in legislative goals, it is unclear
at the present time whether the new statutes can achieve both the
promotion of fairer employment contracts than have prevailed in
the past and the prevention of all strikes in public employment.
Furthermore, it is clear that the achievement of both of these goals
I. Eighteen states now have collective bargaining laws for at least some public
employees. Many of these statutes are very limited in scope and deal only with
specific employee groups such as teachers and firemen. Teachers: CAL. EDuc. CODE
§§ 13080-88 (West 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153(a), I0-153(e) to (f) (1967),
§§ 10-153(b) to (d) (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.19-.26 (Supp. 1969); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 79-1287 to -1296 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 342.450-.470 (1965); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.3-1 to -16 (Supp. 1969); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28.72.010-.090
(Supp. 1967). Fire fighters: CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962 (\Vest Supp. 1968); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 980-92 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp.
1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.1-1 to -14 (Supp. 1969); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265
to -273 (1967). These limited group statutes vary widely in the extent of rights
granted. More general coverage is afforded by statutes in other states. Some such
statutes permit bargaining with any employee group: ALAS. STAT. §§ 23.40.010-.040
(1962); CAL. GoVT. CODE §§ 3500-11 (West Supp. 1968); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 243.710-.780
(1967). Other statutes provide for the election of an exclusive bargaining agent, duties
to bargain, mediation, and unfair labor practice remedies: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-467 to -478 (Supp. 1969); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-13 (Supp. 1968); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178D (1965), §§ 178F to N (Supp. 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 423.201-.254 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.50-.58 (1966); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500.530 (Supp. 1968); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 34:13A-1 to -11 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24, §§ 1-13, [1969] N.Y. Laws
39 (McKinney Supp. April 10, 1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.4-1 to -19 (1968);
VT, STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-05 (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 41.56.010-.900
(Supp. 1967); WIS. STAT. § 111.70 (municipal employees) (1969); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.80-.94
(1969).
2. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 467-78 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.51
(1966); Mo. REv. STAT. § 105.540 (Supp. 1968); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 34:13A-l to -11
(Supp. 1968); N.Y. Crv. $ERV. LAw § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24,
§ 8, [1969] N.Y. Laws 42 (McKinney Supp. April 10, 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 243.780
(1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.120 (Supp. 1967); Wrs. STAT. § 111.70(4)(2) (1969).
Only Vermont has recognized a right to strike for situations in which the exercise
of such right does not endanger the public health, welfare, or safety. VT. STAT, ANN.
tit. 21, § 1704 (Supp. 1968).
3. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH, L. REv. 931 (1969).
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by a "solution" such as simply granting all employee demands is
unacceptable. Such an approach would ignore the interest of the
taxpayer who, because he lacks the freedom to buy fewer government services if labor costs raise the price of those services, must
generally bear such increased costs through higher taxes. Thus, any
proposed solution of the basic policy conflict embodied in public
sector labor legislation must seek to reconcile the employees' interest
in more favorable terms and conditions of employment with two
competing concerns: the prevention of public employee strikes and
the avoidance of an excessive tax burden.

I. AN EXAMPLE OF THE DILEMMA
A. Public Sector Labor Legislation in Michigan
Union officials have characterized Michigan's statute on labor
relations in public employment as the "best" of the recent state
laws. 4 Michigan public employees were granted extensive collective
bargaining rights in the 1965 Public Employee Relations Act
(PERA), 11 which was drafted on the model of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).6 It affirms the right of public employees to
join labor organizations, 7 specifies election proceedings for the determination of an exclusive bargaining representative for an appropriate unit, 8 requires the governmental employer to bargain in good
faith, 9 prohibits interference or discrimination by the employer, 10
and provides the employee with remedies for employer unfair labor
practices. 11 But the Michigan PERA departed from the NLRA
model by retaining the strike prohibition that had existed prior
to its enactment.12 The 1965 legislation did, however, repeal several
sections which had been tied to the strike prohibition and which
had provided specific penalties to be imposed upon those who participated in a public employee strike. 13
Following adoption of the PERA, many local governmental
units in Michigan were for the first time confronted by their em4. Government Employee Relations Report [hereinafter GERR] No. 282, at AA-5
(Feb. 3, 1969).
5. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-.254 (1967).
6. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-68 (1964).
7. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.209 (1967).
8. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.211-.212 (1967).
9. MICH. COMP, LAWS ANN. § 423.215 (1967).
IO. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.210 (1967).
11. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 (1967) provides remedies for violations by the
employer of prohibitions enumerated in § 423.210.
12. MICH. COMP, LAWS ANN, § 423.201 (1967).
13. The 1965 amendment repealed Law of July 3, 1947, no. 336, § 4, [1947] Mich.
Acts 633, providing for automatic termination of employment for violation of the
act, and § 8 providing criminal penalties for any nonemployee inciting a strike.
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ployees with a demand to bargain. Since many inexperienced parties
were entering the collective bargaining arena, it was perhaps inevitable that difficult disputes would arise.14

B. The Holland School Dispute
In Holland, Michigan, the Board of Education began negotiations with the Holland Education Association-the teachers' representative-in March 1967. The teachers' contracts expired in June
of that year, but bargaining continued beyond that time. During
the negotiations, the Association requested mediation, and later,
fact-finding. 15 On August 18, 1967, although no contract agreement
had been reached, the Board of Education unilaterally notified the
teachers' representative that September 5 had been set for the opening of school. On September 2, 1967, pursuant to the PERA, the
teachers filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that the Board
had refused to bargain in good faith. 16 The parties failed to reach
agreement on a contract at a negotiating session on September 4,
and the Holland teachers voted to "withhold their services," until
a contract had been signed. Accordingly, they did not report for
work the next day.
14. When public employee bargaining first goes into effect, negotiating problems
are quite likely to arise. Many administrators tend to be uncertain of the scope of
their authority to make agreements concerning expenditures of yet uncommitted
public funds. For discussion, see Anderson, Public Collective Bargaining and Social
Change, GERR No. 257, at E-1, E-2 (Aug. 12, 1968); Rehmus, Constraints on Local
Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REv. 919 (1969). Moreover,
newly formed local bargaining units, after achieving representative status with a bare
majority, are eager to produce benefits for the employees in order to avoid being
supplanted by a more militant union. Hence, they tend to press for large raises in
salary. See generally Hildebrand, The Public Sector, in FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 125 (1967) [hereinafter Hildebrand]. But this tendency to seek large pay
increases has not, at least in Michigan, resulted in the enrichment of public school
teachers to the detriment of other needs in the area of public education. Indeed, the
percentage of education funds spent on teachers' salaries has remained nearly constant.
GERR No. 256, at B-1 (Aug. 5, 1968).
15. Michigan's Public Employee Relations Act [hereinafter PERA] specifically pro•
vides for mediation of public employee disputes by the State Labor Mediation Board.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.207 (1967). The fact-finding function is derived from
the general mediation provisions. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.25 (1967).
16. The Michigan statute is silent as to whether a school board has exclusive power
to set the opening of school. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 340.575 (1967) allows
the school board to determine the length of the school year. But § 15 of the Michigan
PERA, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967), requires the employer to negotiate
wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The Holland Education Association
argued, apparently unsuccessfully, that the opening of school was a "condition
of employment" negotiable under the statute, and that since the opening date
had in fact been a subject of the negotiations, the school district could not properly set the calendar until agreement on that point had been reached. Brief for
Defendant at IO, School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 7 Mich. App. 569 (1967). In
rejecting the argument, the decision of the court was consistent with analogous law
under the National Labor Relations Act which permits employers to institute unilateral changes after impasse has been reached. See NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312
F.2d 610 (1st Cir. 1963).
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On September 6, the Board of Education petitioned the Circuit
Court for Ottawa County for a preliminary injunction ordering the
teachers to refrain from the strike action. The injunction was
granted the same day. 17 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed
the issuance of the injunction.18
The Holland Education Association took the case to the Supreme
Court of Michigan.19 The teachers argued that since they had not
signed contracts after the expiration of their old agreements in June
1967, they were not "public employees."20 They reasoned that therefore their action could not be considered a strike and thus prohibited
by the PERA.21 They further contended that "discipline" of employees was the exclusive remedy open to employers under the new
statute,22 and that injunctive relief was thereby precluded. In any
event, they argued, the employer should be denied use of the injunctive remedy because he had refused to bargain in good faith. 23
Finally, the teachers contended that an injunction was proper only
when a court had found that a particular strike would cause irreparable harm to the public.24 The Michigan Supreme Court accepted the last two of these arguments, dissolved the injunction,
and remanded the case for consideration of whether irreparable
harm to the public would result if the strike were not enjoined.25
The Holland decision raises many of the fundamental questions
which are present whenever a statute grants collective bargaining
rights to public employees without lifting the traditional ban on
strikes. This Comment will examine several of those problems, and
will then consider what approach to public sector labor relations
might best reconcile the conflicting goals which are exhibited. in
statutes such as Michigan's PERA.
II. Sol\m PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE STRIKE BAN

A. "Strikes" Are Prohibited-What Is a "Strike"?
In Holland, the teachers argued that they were not on "strike"
within the meaning of the Michigan statute. They contended that
17. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., No. 1238 (Mich. Cir. Ct. for Ottawa
County Sept. 6, 1967). The temporary injunction was phrased as an order to refrain
from unlawful activity-striking-rather than as a mandatory order to return to work.
18. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 7 Mich. App. 569 (1967).
19. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
20. 380 Mich. at 322, 157 N.W.2d at 208.
21. 380 Mich. at 322, 157 N.W.2d at 208.
22. 380 Mich. at 324, 157 N.W.2d 209; see MrcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 432.206 (1967).
23. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211.
24. 380 Mich. at 326, 157 N.W.2d at 210.
25. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211.
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since they had not yet signed contracts with the school district,
they could not be "employees" subject to the PERA.26 Although
two of the justices favoring reversal accepted that contention,27 the
remainder of the majority found a continuing employment relationship which was substantial enough that absence from work constituted an illegal strike under the comprehensive definition contained
in the Michigan statute. 28 In this respect, Holland is analogous to
National Labor Relations Board decisions holding that even though
a particular collective bargaining contract has expired, the parties
to that contract_ remain subject to the provisions of the NLRA.
The emphasis in those cases is on the continuation of the employment relationships, not merely on the existence of a contract.29 The
Holland majority supported its interpretation by reference to its
earlier decision in Garden City School District v. Labor Mediation
Board. 30 In that case, the court held that school teachers who were
between contract periods were "employees" and thus qualified under state law to utilize the statutory mediation procedures available
to public employees.31 A holding in Holland that the teachers were
not "employees" with respect to the no-strike provisions of the
PERA would have presented at least an apparent inconsistency.
Hence, the court rejected the teachers' argument. 32
In Holland there was a concerted refusal to work; consequently,
26. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 340.569 (1967).
27. These were Justices Souris and Kavanagh. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 2II
(concurring opinion).
28. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.201 (1967) defines "strike" as "the failure to
report for duty, the wilful absence from one's position, the stoppage of work, or the
abstinence in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of the
duties of employment, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coercing a change
in the conditions, or compensation, or the rights, privileges or obligations of employ•
ment."
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. MacKay Radio&: Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
30. 358 Mich. 258, 99 N.W2d 485 (1959).
31. 358 Mich. at 262, 99 N.W.2d at 487. Those procedures are provided by MICH.
COMP, LAWS ANN. §§ 423.207, 423.25 (1967).
32. 380 Mich. at 323, 99 N.W.2d at 209. This interpretation is supported by statutory provisions granting teachers tenure protection [MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 38.91
(1967)] and by provisions requiring teachers to give sixty days notice of termination of
employment in order to retain tenure benefits (§ 38.III).
Yet the opposite conclusion would not necessarily be "inconsistent" with the overall intent of the act. The decision in Garden City School Dist. v. Labor Mediation
Bd., 358 Mich. 258, 99 N,W.2d 485 {1959), was inescapable if the statutory mediation
services were to be of any use at all; if they were not available until a contract had
been signed, there would presumably never be any need for them. Hence the Garden
City decision might be viewed as necessary to extend to future employees the protection of the Michigan labor mediation statute. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.25 (1967).
Such an interpretation would be consistent with the analogous provision of NLRA
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a){3) (1964), which provides protection from antiunion activity to certain nonemployees. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.2IO(c) (1967) for the
parallel provision of Michigan's PERA, forbidding employer discrimination with
respect to hiring or settling terms and conditions of employment.
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once the employment relationship had been established, the court did
not have to interpret the facts liberally in order to hold that the refusal was a "strike." But in other cases, employee activities short of
refusals to work under an unexpired contract have been broadly construed as strikes. For example, National Education Association
"sanctions" have been held to constitute a strike,33 as have fire
fighters' "partial staffing" campaigns.34 Greater definitional problems arise, however, when the alleged strike consists of "working
by the rules" or, in the case of policemen, strict enforcement of the
law.35
This readiness on the part of the courts to find that a strike exists
can be supported on the ground that it effectuates the legislative
purpose in continuing the strike ban. But the technical arguments
advanced in Holland and the resort to quasi-strike tactics highlight
the frustration of public employees who are dissatisfied with the
terms and conditions of their employment but who are prohibited
from striking. Such manifestations of frustration suggest that providing a precise definition of a "strike" will not be the best way
to stabilize labor relations in the public sector. Rather, it will be
far more profitable to concentrate on procedures that will make
the collective bargaining process more effective in avoiding disruption and in producing results which will be viewed as legitimate by
employees, employers, and the public.

B. Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of a Statutory
Strike Ban
Assuming that the employees' conduct in a particular situation
is held to constitute a strike for purposes of the statute, the question
then arising is what remedial measures a court should provide. Although the issuance of an injunction immediately upon finding that
a strike has occurred is consistent with the legislative intent manifested in the strike ban, inflexible adherence to such a pattern may
only aggravate already strained labor relations. Moreover, while
that consideration is substantial in itself, there are, in addition,
limitations on the power of courts to issue injunctions against
33. Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d
867 (1968) (blacklisting of school district by National Education Association). See also
Board of Educ. v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (purported mass resignation).
34. GERR No. 271, at B-9 (Nov. 18, 1968). "Partial staffing" is a refusal by the
fire fighters to engage in routine or administrative work.
35. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931, 935 (1969).
For a general discussion of the use of "strike substitutes" as negotiating weapons in
the public sector, see Wortman, Collective Bargaining Tactics in the Federal Civil
Service, 15 LAD. L.J. 482, 489 (1964). Another example of such tactics was shown recently in the "sick-out" by airport traffic controllers, which resulted in a traffic slowdown and delays. GERR No. 302, at A-9 (June 23, 1969).
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striking public employees. Even if an injunction is constitutionally permissible, 86 it may be as difficult to enforce as would be
a positive order to work-an order that courts of equity are traditionally loathe to issue.87 How can a court ensure that a group of
professional teachers is performing adequately rather than continuing to engage in illegal concerted activity through failure to fulfill
their duties? Furthermore, in situations involving skilled public
employees, the public may be harmed more by slipshod performance than by a temporary suspension of services. Indeed, a delay
in the opening of school may be more desirable than an extended
period during which "teaching" occurs under judicial coercion.
The most serious practical effect of a stringent injunction policy
is that it can breed distrust of the legal process. When labor relations have deteriorated to a point at which employees will violate
the antistrike law, those employees may also be prepared to take
the final step of disregarding a court order. If they do so, the limits
of judicial enforcement have been reached, and the underlying
respect crucial to the judicial process is gone. A court faced with
a wholesale refusal to obey its order has no recourse but to use contempt citations. Subsequent fining or incarceration of violators may
serve only to reinforce public employees' beliefs that any law which
denies them rights enjoyed by other workers is fundamentally unfair.38
36. It is sometimes argued that use of the injunction in public employee labor
disputes both violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude and
abridges freedom of speech. The involuntary servitude argument stems from the fact
that the injunctions have the effect of ordering persons to work, even though they are
phrased in a nonmandatory fashion, that is, as an order to cease illegal activitystrikes. The argument is typically countered by the observation that the employees
remain free to resign at any time. In re Block, 50 N.J. 494, 236 A.2d 589 (1967).
Under an injunction of "illegal concerted activity," however, the employees are not
free to resign in concert, and such an injunction may be worded broadly enough to
make any resignation suspect. See Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey
Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 247 A.2d 867 (1968) (submission of resignations by teachers
as part of sanctions held concerted action to illegal end and enjoined). See also Board
of Educ. v. Shanker, 54 Misc. 2d 941, 283 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (purported mass
resignation held to be an illegal strike).
The argument that an injunction in the public sector abridges freedom of speech
is countered by the "illegal ends" doctrine-that when the exercise of speech is incident to a course of illegal activity, its suppression is valid. See, e.g., City of Pawtucket
v. Pawtucket Teachers Alliance, Local 930, 87 R.I. 364, 141 A.2d 624 (1958), in which
the court held that there was no violation of freedom of speech when a union leader
was held in contempt of an antistrike injunction for giving a public speech calling for a
strike. But cf. In re Colin Scott Berry, 68 Cal. App. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr.
273 (1968), in which the court held that an order enjoining all strike activities includ•
ing informational picketing was unconstitutionally broad.
37. See, e.g., Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894); Wakeham v. Barker, 82
Cal. 46, 22 P. 1131 (1889).
38. For discussion of New York City's painful experience in this regard see Khecl,
Report to Speaker Anthony J. Travia on the Taylor Law, with a Proposed Plan to
Prevent Strikes by Public Workers (Feb. 21, 1968) [hereinafter Kheel Report]; Kheel,
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These problems confronted the Michigan Supreme Court in
the Holland case. The strike, on its face, was illegal; that illegality
was the sole basis upon which the lower court had issued the injunction. The supreme court, however, refused to allow the injunction merely upon proof of a strike ban violation. Instead, it
accepted the teachers' argument that the injunction could not issue
unless the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief were established.39 Thus, an employer-plaintiff seeking an injunction against
striking public workers in Michigan must now enter court with
"clean hands," that is, the employer must first have bargained in
good faith. 40 In addition, the employer must show that irreparable
harm to the public will result from the strike.41 In effect, the Holland court applied the same standards for enjoining strikes by public school teachers that it has applied to strikes by employees in
the private sector.42 While that approach appears reasonable, it
requires further analysis.
First, private sector precedent restricting the use of injunctions
in labor disputes is inapposite to the public sector in which strikes
are not otherwise legal.43 A strike by public employees is a direct
violation of a statute, even when there is no violence or irreparable
injury to the public. Therefore, by applying the irreparable-harm
Points for Consideration by the Governor's Conference on Public Employment Relations, GERR No. 267, at H-1 (Oct. 24-, 1968); Montana, Striking Teachers, Welfare,
Transit, and Sanitation Workers, 19 LAB. L.J. 273 (1968).
!19. Many courts, however, have rejected this argument in the case of an illegal
strike by public employees. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, for example, in an
action to enjoin teachers' sanctions against a school district, recently held that absence
of present injury from the threatened sanctions and the lack of "clean hands" by the
employer would not prevent ac- injunction from issuing. Board of Educ. of Union
Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 43, 247 A.2d 867, 875 {1968). That decision was reached under a collective bargaining statute similar to that in force in
Michigan. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 34-13a-1 to -11 (Supp. 1968). On the other hand, under a
present New York statute-N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1968)-a public employer is unconditionally obligated to seek an injunction of an illegal strike,
and the court is required under N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 751(2) (McKinney 1968) to
grant it. But in this connection, the Michigan court in the Holland decision indicated that a legislative attempt to compel a court of equity to issue an injunction in
every instance of a public employee strike would be "to destroy the independence
of the judicial branch of government." 380 Mich. 314, 325, 157 N.W.2d 206, 210
(1968).
40. 380 Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211.
41. 380 Mich. at 326, 57 N.W.2d at 210.
42. Unlike some states, Michigan has no "little Norris-LaGuardia Act" restricting
the use of injunctions in labor disputes. But Michigan courts have in the past developed a public policy against issuing injunctions absent a showing of violence or
irreparable harm. See School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 326, 157
N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968); Cross Co. v. Local 155, UAW, 371 Mich. 184, 123 N."W.2d 215
(1963).
43. In fact, federal labor policy, as embodied in the NLRA and the NorrisLaGuardia Act, considers the right to strike as fundamental to private sector employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15, 163 (1964).
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standard of the private sector to public sector strikes, the court appears to have disregarded the legislative intent expressed in the antistrike statute. That disregard suggests that the decision was prompted
by other factors not specifically mentioned in the opinion. For example, a resolution which favored the issuing of an injunction on the
mere showing of a strike could present the severe enforcement
problems already discussed, 44 and, more seriously, could erode the
employees' confidence in the legal system.45 Still more important is
the possibility that a decision which made injunctive relief universally available against public employee strikes would render illusory the collective bargaining rights granted under the PERA,
because the employer could then invariably depend upon the injunction to enforce his bargaining position, regardless of whether
he had bargained in good faith. Accordingly, although the Holland
court relied on a questionable analogy to private sector strikes, its
decision can be supported on the ground that it comes closest to
effecting judicially what must be the central legislative intent of
the Michigan PERA-to provide an effective bargaining system. Indeed, by rendering uncertain the availability of injunctive relief,
the court probably promoted prestrike settlements. Since neither
the employer nor the union can depend upon the injunction or
the strike to enforce its demands, each party is encouraged to use
the bargaining process in order to reach a settlement.
It is apparent that much of the benefit stemming from the uncertainty created by the Holland decision will be only temporary.
As subsequent case law develops standards concerning the conditions under which an injunction will issue in public employee
strikes, parties will incorporate those standards into their respective
bargaining positions. Hence the bargaining will not differ substantially from the pre-Holland situation. Moreover, in cases in which,
according to the standards developed, an injunction will not be
issued, those employees will then have, in effect, the right to strike.46
While such a result may or may not prove to be a public evil, it is
clear that the result is not consistent with the intent of no-strike
legislation.47
44. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
46. The Holland decision has apparently been interpreted by local courts as effectively removing the injunction from many public employee labor disputes. Board
of Educ. v. Chippewa Valley Educ. Assn., No. S68-4660 (Mich. Cir. Ct. for Macomb
County, filed Oct. 28, 1968), reprinted in GERR No. 272, at B-5 (Nov. 25, 1968).
Moreover, Holland would not affect the right employers have under l\lICH, COMP,
LAws ANN. § 423.206 (1967) to discipline striking employees subsequent to the strike.
But that power is ordinarily of little practical value, since a public employer confronted with labor strife is generally reluctant to disturb a freshly achieved settlement
by disciplining the individuals involved.
47. See Taylor, Impasse Procedure-The Finality Question, Remarks at New York
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In the final analysis, then, the Holland decision seems, at best, a
temporary expedient necessitated by a judicial perception of the
inherently conflicting aims of strike prevention through legislative
prohibition on the one hand and collective bargaining on the other.
If the conflict is ever to be adequately resolved, it is incumbent
upon the legislature to devise more appropriate means by which
the dual goals of meaningful bargaining and strike prevention may
be achieved.

III.

APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

As is indicated by the foregoing discussion of the Holland decision, even the more "progressive" of the new public employee
statutes have failed to resolve the problems of labor relations in the
public sector. At least, however, the statutes have served to illustrate
the nature and extent of the conflict which exists in the area. The
following discussion will consider four possible remedial approaches
which have traditionally been used or which could be used for resolving the conflict: the punitive approach, recognition of a limited
right to strike, the aid to bargaining approach, and the unfair labor
practice proceeding.
A. The Punitive Approach
The punitive approach is based on the theory that the imposition of penalties for striking will deter future strikes. The pattern
for punitive statutes was set by New York's Condon-Wadlin La·w48
which provided for the automatic dismissal of striking employees,
with the provision that any striker subsequently rehired could not
receive higher pay for three years following the strike, and would
remain on probation for five years. 49 Punitive provisions of this sort
have not been very effective in preventing public employee strikes,
for several reasons. First, when enforcement is at the discretion of
the employer, sanctions are rarely invoked, because employees dismissed on account of strike activity may be hard to replace. Moreover, when union organization is strong, a public employer is not
likely to dismiss striking employees, because such measures would
probably only exacerbate an already delicate situation. Mandatory
sanctions have been only slightly more successful, because the same
Governor's Conference on Public Employee Relations, in GERR No. 267, at G-1
(Oct. 10, 1968).
48. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967).
49. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, § I, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, § I [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). The antistrike
provision of the Minnesota collective bargaining law is substantially similar to the
Condon-Wadlin Law in that respect. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.55 (1966).
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considerations which prevent management from invoking discretionary sanctions also encourage it to evade required sanctions
whenever possible. 50
Since statutory sanctions against striking employees have proved
largely unsuccessful in preventing strikes, 51 such provisions have
generally been omitted from the newer public employment relations acts. The Michigan PERA, for example, removed all the statutory sanctions except the employer's discretionary right to dismiss
a striking employee, and the impact of that remaining sanction is
diminished by the statute's provision of procedural safeguards for
the employee. 52 When New York's Taylor Law53 was enacted, provisions for sanctions against individual employees were removed
in favor of sanctions directed against the union organization itself.fi4
Another aspect of the traditional punitive approach which contributes to its ineffectiveness in producing stable labor relations
relates to its after-the-fact nature. Sanctions are not applied until
the labor relations have degenerated into a strike situation, and
when punitive measures are introduced at that late stage, the effect
may be to make the employees more militant and less amenable to
rational settlement. 55
Even more fundamentally, it may be suggested that the traditional punitive approach is inherently productive of instability in
labor relations. When its impact is not offset by any grant of bar50. Thus, when New York City vehicle drivers went on strike in 1962, the employees "dismissed" under the Condon-Wadlin Law were simply shifted to re-employment in other city departments following the strike. Montana, supra note 38, at 274.
51. From 1947 to 1959, for example, there occurred over 450 strikes by public em•
ployees. See Note, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 75 HARV. L. REv. 391, 407
(1961).
52. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 423.206 (1967). It was removal of the statutory sanctions from the Michigan law which prompted the Holland teachers to argue that the
substituted provision for employer "discipline" was intended to be an exclusive
remedy and that therefore the court was precluded from issuing an injunction. School
Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 324, 157 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1968). The
court, however, rejected that argument, and construed the statute as not affecting the
"historic power of courts to enjoin strikes by public employees." 380 Mich. at 325, 157
N.W.2d at 210, citing Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d ll42 (1953).
53. N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24,
§§ 1-13, [1969] N.Y. Laws 39 (McKinney Supp. April 10, 1969). The Taylor Law replaced the Condon-Wadlin Law.
54. Under the Taylor Law, penalties for violating the strike prohibition included
fines against the union, loss of dues check-off privileges, and, ultimately, withdrawal
of recognition. However, in March 1969, the Taylor Law was amended to reinstate
penalties against individual employees. Ch. 24, § 8 [1969] N.Y. Laws 42-43 (McKinney
Supp. April 10, 1969), amending N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw § 210(2) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
For each strike day, the individual employee must have the equivalent of two days
pay deducted from his paycheck. The provision for strike penalties has been recently
criticized by George W. Taylor, who recommends repeal of those provisions. GERR
No. 317, at B-9 (Oct. 6, 1969).
55. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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gaining rights-as has been the case until recent years-the punitive
approach produces a severe imbalance of bargaining power. Employees are faced with the choices of taking whatever the employer
offers, quitting, or striking and facing the penalties. Under such
circumstances, it may reasonably appear to the employees that they
have little to lose by striking. A stringently punitive approach may
be functional as long as employees are unorganized and jobs are
scarce. But as the relative affiuence and strength of employee organizations increase, the obvious inequity of the purely punitive approach may encourage public employee strikes rather than prevent
them.

B. The Limited Right To Strike
One of the main difficulties in public employee collective bargaining stems from the prohibition of strikes. If that prohibition
did not exist, it might be assumed that bargaining would proceed
much as it does in the private sector with both parties negotiating
in a mutual effort to avoid work stoppage. Negotiations would be
more effective and would arguably result in fewer strikes. Some
observers have therefore advocated the recognition of a limited
right to strike. That approach has been recommended by the
Pennsylvania Governor's Advisory Commission, 56 the New York
K.heel Report, 57 the Maryland Governor's Report, 58 and various
labor groups. 59 It would grant the right to strike to all public employees except those engaged in areas crucial to the public safety,
such as police and fire fighters, for whom impasses could be resolved
by compulsory arbitration.60
While the concept of the limited right to strike has an undeniable appeal, it does not appear to offer the best solution to the
56. Governor's Commission To Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsylvania,
Report and Recommendations, June 1968, reprinted in GERR No. 251, at E-1 (July I,
1968) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Report].
57. Kheel Report, supra note 38. Kheel recommends that if a strike situation
should develop, and if the public services involved are critical, there might be a
provision for a Taft-Hartley style "cooling-off" injunction. Kheel Report, supra note
38, at 32.
58. Governor's Task Force on Public Employee Labor Relations, Report and
Recommendations, Dec. 23, 1968, reprinted in GERR No. 278, at AA-3 (Jan. 6, 1969)
[hereinafter Maryland Report]. This report of Governor Agnew's task force is particularly illustrative of the sharp differences of opinion over the strike question. Five of
the seventeen members dissented from the committee recommendations-an unusual
occurrence since such committees are notorious for their unanimity. See generally
Lehman, Crime, the Public, and the Crime Commission: A Critical Review of the
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1487, 1499-509 (1968).
59. See, e.g., Address by Jerry Wurf, President of the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees [hereinafter AFSCME], GERR No. 266, at
F-3 (Oct. 14, 1968).
60. See Pennsylvania Report, supra note 56, at E-1.
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problems of public employment. 61 Moreover, advocacy of a limited
right to strike is likely to be a mere academic exercise because implementation of that approach will probably remain politically
impossible. It has been said that the "public will tolerate the fact
of strike in public employment to the point of extremis; but will
not accept the principle of the right to strike." 62 The political obstacle to recognizing that right was recently demonstrated in Pennsylvania when the governor, in submitting the Commission's
recommendations to the legislature, omitted the provisions which
favored the limited right to strike. 63
It might be argued that, as a practical matter, explicit recognition
of the right to strike is not necessary for that right to exist as an
element in collective bargaining. Since the strike prohibition means
little without enforcement machinery, a legislature can give tacit
recognition to the strike power simply by removing punitive sanctions. To some extent, that is now the case in Michigan, where the
statutory sanctions have been removed64 and the availability of
injunctive relief has been limited by Holland to situations involving violence or irreparable harm. 65
Tacit recognition of the right to strike when the statutory prohibition remains has been criticized as fostering disrespect for law; 00
but tacit recognition might be a lesser evil than the present public
61. Some have denounced the idea of a limited right to strike as illusory in that
it would apply to relatively few employees. For instance, according to an Address by
George W. Taylor at the New York Governor•s Conference [GERR No. 267, at G·l,
G-4 (Oct. 21, 1968)], only 1.3 million of 6.4 million local government employees arc
engaged in activities that are clearly nonessential.
62. Speech by Arvid Anderson, GERR No. 257, at E·l, E-3 (Aug. 12, 1968), quoting
Saul Wallen, arbitrator on the New York Board of Collective Bargaining.
63. GERR No. 267, at B-1 (Oct. 21, 1968). A similar example occurred in New
Jersey when Democratic Governor Hughes vetoed the Republican legislature's public
employment bill on the ground that it was not explicit enough in outlawing the
public employee strike. However, the legislature enacted the bill over the veto, and
in a subsequent court test, the original wording proved to be adequate to maintain
the strike prohibition. Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53
N.J. 29, 47, 247 A.2d 867, 877 (1968).
64. The 1965 Act repealed sections providing criminal penalties (Law of July 3,
1947, no. 336, § 8, [1947] Mich. Acts 633), loss of employment and retirement rights
(§ 4), and restrictions on re-employment (§ 5). The employer is left with a rather
obscure power to discipline strikers [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.206 (1967)]. But
the severity of that power is tempered by the inclusion of procedural safeguards in
the disciplinary process (§ 423.206), and by the fact tliat as a practical matter employers are not likely to invoke sanctions which can be applied only after employees
have returned to work. After tlie employees have returned, tlie employer is likely to be
more interested in preserving newly cemented relations tlian in punishing strikers
and tliereby risking furtlier strife.
65. 380 Mich. 314, 326, 157 N.W.2d 206, 210 (1968). See note 42 supra.
66. See Address by George W. Taylor, supra note 61, at G-3. Indeed, such a backdoor approach to tlie strike question may appear particularly ill-advised at a time
of public concern for law and order-a concern prompted in part perhaps by tlie
apparent tendency of many to disregard laws tliat tliey consider personally distasteful.
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employee laws which may seem to workers to be so grossly unfair
that respect for "law" deteriorates to the point that the leaders will
defy even an injunction. Indeed, subsequent incarceration of strike
leaders raises them to martyr status, and the resulting mass movement psychology unifies employees even more strongly against the
law.67 In view of that consideration, tacit recognition may well result in more respect for the law than would otherwise be the case.
Even if some form of recognition of the right to strike is feasible,
it may still be questioned whether granting that right will provide
an adequate solution to the problems of public sector labor relations. The arguments in favor of recognition of the right to strike
rest upon the analogy to the private sector. It is thought that since
the strike in the private sector serves to equalize bargaining power
and to encourage serious negotiations, the strike power would produce similar benefits in the public employment situation. 68 However, in view of the unique characteristics of public employment,
the validity of an analogy to the private sector may be seriously
doubted.
The fundamental factor ignored by proponents of recognition
is that while the strike may be necessary to give private employees
bargaining power sufficient to offset their employer's power, public
employees may already possess bargaining leverage not available to
those in the private area. The added leverage stems from the essentially political nature of public employment. The employer is
charged with the political responsibility of regulating public services: the transit must be kept running; the garbage removed; and
the schools kept open. Any prolonged cessation of such important
services is likely to reflect adversely upon public servants in politically sensitive positions. Hence, there may be strong pressure
on the employer to settle quickly except when union demands are
highly excessive. In addition, public employee unions may have a
degree of leverage stemming from direct political control. Indeed,
the traditional, and only, methods by which public employees have
exerted their influence have been lobbying and political redress
at the polls. 69 Although those methods tend to be inadequate by
themselves, they can be formidable when used in conjunction with
a strong organization.70 In light of the increasing significance of
67. See Address by Jerry Wurf, supra note 59.
68. See, e.g., Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966
Wis. L. R.Ev. 549, 557; Kheel Report, supra note 38, at 15.
69. See, e.g., Smith &: McLaughlin, Public Employment: A Neglected Area of Re•
search and Training in Labor Relations, 16 INous. &: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 30, 37 (1962).
See also Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 931, 932 (1969).
70. Lobbying by organized public employees has been used most effectively by
postal unions. In 1960, for example, after President Eisenhower had vetoed a bill to
raise the pay of federal employees and had criticized the "unconcealed political pres-
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public employment, both in terms of actual numbers of employees
and in terms of percentage of the total work force, 71 political pressure shows little indication of diminishing in effectiveness.72 A possible further strengthening of the traditional political approach is
suggested by the erosion of restrictions on the political activities of
public employees.73 As a consequence of those collateral powers,
public employee unions may possess the balance of political power,
and, in effect, have the power to fire their employers for failure to
meet union demands. Indeed, in the extreme case, it may be possible even to replace the public official with a union representative. 74
sures exerted ••• on Congress by . . . employees," Congress overrode the veto, an
action accomplished only one other time in the Eisenhower administration. W. HART,
COLI.ECTJ.VE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 26 (1961).
71. Between 1930 and 1960 the percentage of public employees in the civilian
labor force increased from 6% to 12%. Smith &: McLaughlin, supra note 69, at 31.
Moreover, state and local governments alone are responsible for one out of every two
nonfarm jobs created, with a rate of increase three times that in private employment.
U.S. OFFICE OF MANPOWER, AUTOMATION &: TRAINING, DEPT. OF LABOR MANPOWER,
EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS IN GOVERNMENT 1, 11 (No. 9,
1963). See generally Donoian, The AFGE and the AFSCME: Labor's Hope for the
Future?, 18 LAB. L.J. 727 (1967).
72. That a public employee union's political skills remain an important consideration was illustrated by the recent employee representation election campaign in the
Internal Revenue Service. In that campaign, the ability of the contending unions to
influence Congress was a central issue. GERR No. 274, at A-1 (Dec. 9, 1968). The
power of political persuasion is also evidenced by organized labor's opposition to any
reorganization of the Post Office which would diminish congressional control over
wages. See Statement by George Meany to House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, GERR No. 308, at A-4, F-1 (Aug. 4, 1969). In light of the continuing existence
of state legislative restraints on local governments' taxing power and therefore on
their spending [see Rehmus, Constraints on Local Government in Public Employee
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REv. 919, 921-26 (1969)], and in light of the need for political
appropriation of the bulk of local governments' spending, it seems highly unlikely
that resort to political pressures will become less frequent once the right to strike is
accepted. But see Note, supra note 68, at 561.
73. The view that a public employee can be discharged for publicly criticizing his
employer [see, e.g., Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968), modified, No.
20,812 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 23, 1968)] or for engaging in political activities [Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,
29 N.E. 517 (1892)] has been placed in some doubt by recent decisions protecting
public employees from such discharge. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (school teacher wrongfully discharged for writing public letters critical of school
board); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (teacher wrongfully discharged for refusal to sign loyalty oath); Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857 (Ct.
CI. 1967) (federal employee wrongfully dismissed for writing letter to Secretary of
Navy alleging favoritism in promotion). But cf. United Public Workers of America
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), in which a divided Court upheld provisions of the
Hatch Act [5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968)], restricting political acthities of
federal employees. However, in the federal spheres, these restrictions are coupled with
a positive right of public employees to petition Congress. 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (Supp. IV,
1965-1968), formerly 37 Stat. 555 (1912). For discussion of the apparent erosion of
restrictions on political activities of public employees, see Note, The First Amendment
and Public Employees: Times Marches On, 57 GEO. L.J. 134 (1968).
74. A glaring example of that possibility was the recent disclosure that a county
supervisor in Wayne County, Michigan, concurrently held a position with a public
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The bargaining leverage of a public employee union may be further
increased by the employer's lack of certain ultimate deterrents possessed by many private employers. A private employer, if pushed
to his economic limit, may move to a more favorable location, or
go out of business, whereas, in the public sector, the government
can be depended upon to remain in existence.
If, through a misguided application of the private sector analogy,
a broad strike power is added to these attributes of the public sector, the result may be to tip the balance of bargaining power so
heavily in the union's favor that the employer will be forced to
accede to excessive demands. The cost of meeting those demands
could then be shifted either to public employees providing less
vital services or to the city's taxpayers, since both groups usually
lack countervailing political muscle.75 In such a case, recognition of
the strike power may indeed prevent strikes, but only at the cost of
fostering one-sided settlements.
C. The Aid to Bargaining Approach
Since neither the punitive approach nor recognition of the right
to strike adequately accommodates the interests involved in labor
relations in the public sector, the best remedial approach appears
to be one that aims at balancing power at the bargaining stage.76
employee union representing county employees. Detroit News, Feb. 9, 1969, at 6A,
col. 3.
75. Hildebrand, supra note 14, at 151. A peripheral effect of such shifting may be
to accelerate the flight of business and large taxpayers to the suburbs, where their
relative political power is likely to be much greater. In view of the pervasive concern
for "the urban problem" it seems unwise to encourage the flight of taxpayers from
the cities.
76. Present collective bargaining laws tend, in a limited fashion, to promote a
balance of bargaining power. At a minimum, they assure the right to union organization and representation, thereby eliminating the necessity to strike over that fundamental issue. The traditional power advantage of the employer is further offset by
those statutes which establish a comprehensive right to exclusive representation and
which place the employer under a duty to bargain. Such laws emphasize promotion
of settlements through negotiation rather than punishment of employees after a strike
has occurred. Yet the simple right of representation, even when coupled with a duty
to bargain, is not enough to achieve a balance of power. Especially when the employer has recourse to injunctive relief against strikes, he is unlikely to feel bound to
bargain meaningfully. However, it is in precisely that situation in which the employer
so retains the preponderance of bargaining power that employees are likely to resort
to the strike because of the frustration of their bargaining objectives. Consequently,
it seems that a statute granting bargaining rights which only partly offset the employer's advantage is in fact likely to increase the incidence of strikes because it
promotes employee organization and, hence, a greater capacity to launch strikes.
Thus Michigan, whose public employees enjoy relatively extensive bargaining rights,
experienced more teachers' strikes in 1967-1968 than did any other state. Of 114 walkouts, forty-seven occurred in Michigan, followed by Ohio and Illinois with twelve each,
Pennsylvania with six, and New York with five. GERR No. 276, at B-9 (Dec. 23, 1968).
See also Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH.
L. R.Ev. 943, 945 (1969).
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When bargaining has been unsuccessful-whether due to an imbalance in bargaining power permitting one party to refuse to compromise or due to a stand-off between parties of equal strength-it
may be desirable to have some method of bringing objectivity into
the situation. In this connection, resort has been made to other devices in an attempt to avoid strikes while striving for an equitable
settlement. Among the procedures which have been used to support
the bargaining process in this manner are mediation, fact-finding,
and arbitration.

I. Mediation
Mediation promotes settlements by introducing a third party
who attempts to ease strained relations between the bargaining
parties. The mediator, or conciliator, may act as an intermediary
in communication between the bargaining parties, on the assumption that a party will be more likely to accept a solution proffered
by a neutral party than he is to accept the identical solution proposed by his opponent. There is less reason for suspicion of a
mediator's offer, and a party may more easily save face with his
constituents by accepting the offer of a neutral. The mediator may
also point the way to possible compromise, although his role is
theoretically considered to be the passive one of helping the parties
to agree on their own solutions.
Mediation is widely used in public employee labor disputes,
though present statutes vary as to the type of mediation available.
Some merely permit the parties to consult outsiders; 77 others provide a formal mediation service consisting of general labor mediators78 or specialists in public employee disputes.79 Usually mediation is available only when both parties seek it, but in Michigan
it is available at the request of either party,80 and in New York it
may be ordered by the state Public Employee Relations Board
(PERB). 81
Mediation can be a highly useful aid to bargaining, particularly
in the public sector where the bargaining parties are likely to be
inexperienced. 82 It can also help, to some extent, in lessening an
77. E.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 3505.2 (West 1968).
78. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.207, 423.25 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1705 (1969 Supp.), §§ 501-513 (1959); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (1969).
79. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
80. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.207 (1967).
81. N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
82. In public employee disputes in which parties may be inexperienced bargainers,
mediators serve as teachers as well as conciliators. A competent state mediation service has been viewed as absolutely essential to the operation of a public employee
collective bargaining statute. Yet many states provide none at all or, at best, an ineffective service. See Address by Robert G. Howlett to the Federal Mediation and
Concilation Service Seminar, GERR No. 286, at E-1 (March 3, 1969).
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imbalance of power. For instance, when mediation is available at
the request of either party, or when it can be ordered by the state,
it will ensure that the parties are bargaining. On the other hand,
those statutes which provide for mediation only upon the agreement of both parties are of limited usefulness. When negotiations
have broken down, a party may be reluctant to seek mediation for
fear that his request might be interpreted as evidencing a desire
to compromise his bargaining position. Moreover, even if one party
does seek mediation, the other party may resist simply because of
the adversary impulse fostered by the bargaining. Yet it is precisely
at this point of impasse that mediation is most needed. At the very
least, then, mediation should be available upon request of either
party; 83 and the better solution would be either to require mediation at a certain stage in negotiations84 or to empower a state
agency to order it.85

2. Use of a Fact Finder
The use of a fact finder or a fact-finding committee has been
more effective in assisting bargaining than has mediation.86 That
procedure, sometimes called "advisory arbitration,"87 combines elements of both mediation and arbitration. Unlike the mediator who
works only with the parties' own proposals, the fact finder examines
the merits of the dispute itself. Under the more formal approaches,
the fact finder may conduct hearings, collect evidence, and have a
subpoena power. 88 His recommendations, however, are not binding
on the parties as in arbitration. At most, his findings may be used
in reporting to a political authority, 89 or in making a public recommendation to force public opinion against a recalcitrant party.90
The use of a fact finder is primarily intended to prevent strikes
83. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.207 (1967).
84. See, e.g., Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations, Report to Governor George Romney 8 (1967) [hereinafter Michigan Report].
85. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw § 209(3) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
BG. See Belasco, Resolving Disputes over Contract Terms in the State Public Service, 16 LAB. L.J. 533, 534 (1965).
87. Id. at 533-40.
88. The New York PERB is granted hearing and subpoena power [N.Y. CIV. SERV.
LAW §§ 205(5)(j), (k) (McKinney Supp. 1968)], and may delegate its powers to factfinding boards [N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw § 209(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1968)]; cf. Maryland
Report, supra note 58, at AA-I, AA-7. See also Address by Robert G. Howlett to the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Seminar, GERR No. 286, at E-6 (March 3,
1969); '\VIS. STAT. ANN, § 111.88(2) (1969).
89. It has been recommended that a report to the governor be the final step in the
fact-finding process. Michigan Report, supra note 84, at 11. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. SERv.
LAW § 209(3){c) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
90. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.25 (1967); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 209(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1968).
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by facilitating the settlement of disputes, but its effectiveness in this
regard is not universally acknowledged. Those who charge that the
formal fact-finding procedure tends to discourage rather than to
promote negotiated agreement describe its negative effects in two
ways. Their first contention is that the mere availability of a fact
finder may induce the parties to rely upon that outside aid; 91 if
they do so, a basic virtue of collective bargaining--communication
between the parties-is lost. Second, it is argued that the practice
of making public recommendations may actually hinder agreement
because those issues which might have been negotiable can no
longer be conceded by the party favored in the fact finder's report
without a public loss of face. 92
Nevertheless, these objections to the fact-finding process lose
much of their force if certain distinctions bet\V'een the public and
the private sector are taken into account. In the public sector,
reaching a settlement by negotiation, although important, is less
critical than it is in private employment. More important are the
terms of that settlement: they should be equitable for both of the
parties and for the taxpaying public. The use of a fact finder can
help to create the balance of bargaining power necessary for such
equitable settlements, because public disclosure of the merits of
the dispute can serve to restrict the demands of a powerful union
or to increase the offer of a powerful but politically conscious employer.
Another factor which fundamentally alters the bargaining process in the public sector is the existence of antistrike statutes. In the
current political environment these statutes are not going to disappear, 93 and it is not clear that they should. But given the continued existence of at least a nominal strike ban, the negotiation
process in the public sector will remain inescapably different from
that of private employment. The effectiveness of collective bargaining depends to a large extent on the parties' evaluations of the relative costs of agreement and of disagreement; an employer, for
example, must weigh the cost of a wage increase against the cost of
a strike. When the cost of agreement is exceeded by the cost of
disagreement, the party will usually settle. This process is sometimes not completed until a strike occurs, since at that time the rela91. The possibility of such overreliance on mediation and fact-finding is recognized in the report of the Governor's Advisory Commission in Illinois. See Governor's
Advisory Commission on Labor-Management Policy for Public Employees, Report
and Recommendations 30 (1967). If that report were followed, the Illinois PERB would
be empowered to withhold mediation when it finds that the parties have not in fact
negotiated. See Note, supra note 68, at 566. A similar treatment is possible in Oregon
where the fact-finding is wholly discretionary with the PERB. ORE. REv. STAT.
§§ 243.7-.8 (1969 Supp.).
92. See Kheel Report, supra note 38, at 33.
93. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
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tive costs become more easily ascertainable. However, in the public
sector, the process of cost assessment cannot function in a similar
manner because in that setting the strike is not an acceptable alternative to agreement. Consequently, the process of bargaining in
the public. sector may afford fewer incentives for settlement than
does its private sector counterpart.
Once it is realized that these limitations on bargaining in the
public sector exist, resort to forces which complement the bargaining of the parties becomes less distasteful. Moreover, when the factfinding procedure is viewed in terms of the basic goals of strike
prevention and fair settlements, rather than in terms of bargaining
orthodoxy, it is clear that fact-finding is on balance desirable. Whatever disadvantages it may have in terms of inhibiting negotiations
are compensated for by its tendency to balance bargaining power
and to prevent strikes. Experience indicates that the use of a fact
finder is a successful method of strike prevention. In many cases in
which that device has been instituted, agreement has been reached
prior to the issuance of any report; 94 and when impasse has continued up to the recommendation stage, the fact finder's recommendations have usually been accepted by the parties.95

3. Arbitration
The use of a fact finder, however, even when accompanied by
public disclosure, does not always provide sufficient pressure to
break a bargaining impasse. Consequently, commentators have suggested compulsory arbitration of disputes, and it has been asserted
that binding arbitration is the only effective alternative to recognition of a right to strike.96
There are nv-o general types of arbitration-"interests" and
"grievance." "Interests" arbitration decides the substantive terms of
a new contract, thereby resolving a bargaining impasse, whereas
94. In Massachusetts, for example, out of 200 cases submitted to fact finders in a
two-year period, 140 were resolved prior to the issuance of recommendations. In
Michigan, 56% of such cases were resolved prior to recommendations.· Somewhat less
success was experienced in Connecticut where twenty-six out of fifty-seven were resolved
prior to recommendations, and in New York where only thirty-three out of 150 cases
were settled prior to the fact finder's recommendations. GERR No. 283, at B-3 (Feb.
10, 1969). Perhaps significantly, the higher success rates were in those states combining
mediation with fact-finding.
95. For example, out of fifty cases in '\Visconsin in the two-year period, the fact
finder's recommendations were accepted in 90% of them, and in only three cases
were strikes experienced. In Massachusetts, fact-finding was used in 200 cases, but
only four strikes ensued. GERR No. 283, at B-2, B-3 (Feb. 10, 1969).
96. See, e.g., R. DOHERTY &: '\\T. OBERER, TEACHERS, SCHOOL BOARDS, AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: A CHANGING OF THE GUARD 104 (1967); Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration
in the Public Service, 17 LAB. L.J. 138 (1966); Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements To Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 54 CORNELL L.
REV. 129 (1968).
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"grievance" arbitration settles disputes over the interpretation of
an existing contract. 97 Although the latter type has been used much
more frequently than has the former, it is submitted that the use
of interests arbitration could beneficially be expanded in the public
setting, at least with respect to critical employees such as police and
firemen.
The machinery of arbitration is similar to that of the fact-finding
process. It may take three general forms. First, there is the ad hoc
tripartite approach in which each party chooses one member of the
panel and those two panel members then pick a third disinterested
member. 98 A second approach seeks the services of an outside professional arbitrator, usually chosen by agreement of the parties to
the dispute. 99 In a third approach, most appropriate when there is
compulsory arbitration, an outside body selects the arbitrator. 100
Arbitration may be either compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory
arbitration, in spite of its apparent attractiveness, has seldom been
used to resolve bargaining impasses in public employment, although
some states do provide for compulsory arbitration of impasses for
certain critical employees such as policemen and firemen, 101 public
transportation workers, 102 public utilities workers,1° 3 and hospital
97. Several courts have inferred from comprehensive bargaining laws imposing a
duty to bargain that public employers are permitted to enter grievance arbitration
agreements. See, e.g., Oakland County Sheriff's Dept. v. Local 23, AFSCME, No. C-66,
F-63 (Mich. Lab. Med. Bd.), reprinted in GERR No. 227, at F-1 (Jan. 8, 1968); Local
953, AFSCME v. Benton ·Harbor School Dist., Civil No. 6229(B) (Mich. Cir. Ct. for
Berrien County Oct. 12, 1967), reprinted in GERR No. 216, at E-1 (Oct. 30, 1967);
Local 1226, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967).
The New York statute has been similarly interpreted [see GERR No. 228, at E-1 (Jan.
22, 1967)], and a like statute is in force in New Hampshire. See Tremblay v. Berlin
Police Union, 237 A.2d 668 (N.H. 1968). Some states specifically allow grievance
arbitration. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.350 (1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178k
(Supp. 1968). See generally Note, supra note 51; Note, Labor Law-Public Employment-Arbitration and Agency Shops As Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining, 14 WAYNE
L. RJ::v. 1238 (1968).
98. The new Michigan police and firemen's arbitration statute [Pub. L. No. 312
(Aug. 14, 1969)] has adopted this procedure as has the respective Pennsylvania statute
[PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp. 1969)]. The procedure is also in use in Minnesota
for hospital employees [MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.36 (1966)].
99. The ordinary procedure in this situation is for the parties to request a list of
professional arbitrators from a service, such as the American Arbitration Association,
and to choose a mutually satisfactory arbitrator from that list. See Coulson, Labor
Arbitration-The Insecure Profession, in PRoc. OF N.Y.U. 20rH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
ON l.ABOR 131 (1967).
100. The analogous fact-finding procedure is present in New York where the
PERB orders fact-finding and selects the fact finder. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
101. E.g., Mich. Pub. L. No. 312 (Aug. 14, 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 43, § 217
(Supp. 1969); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-9.19 (1968) (fire fighters); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 27-265 to -276 (1957).
102. LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 23.890(e) (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 55, § 563.2
(1964) (toll bridges and toll roads).
103. NEB, RJ::v. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -823 (1968).
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employees. 104 Moreover, there are very few states that have provisions even for voluntary arbitration. 105 In general, statutes purporting to provide for arbitration tend to do very little. 106 Although
they use the language of arbitration, their procedures are usually
not binding, 107 binding only upon the employees,1° 8 or binding
solely for a limited range of issues such as those "not involving expenditures of money." 109
Reluctance to use arbitration to resolve public employment disputes arises from three factors. First, there is a traditional concern
that provisions for the arbitration of public employment disputes
may constitute an unconstitutional delegation of authority.110 Second, even if there is no legal obstacle, there is a conviction that the
availability of a decision by an arbitrator will discourage serious
efforts at collective bargaining. 111 Finally, there may be some feeling
that it is undesirable to leave essentially political decisions-such
as those concerning how much public employees will be paid and
under what conditions they will work-to one who is not directly
responsible to the public.112
104. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.36 (1966), upheld in Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public
Bldg. Serv. &: Hosp. Employees, Local 113, 241 l\Iinn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), noted
in 39 Minn. L. Rev. 322 (1955).
105. Aus. STAT, § 23.40-010 (1959); !LL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 301 (1960); NEB.
REv. STAT, §§ 48-801 to -823 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13a-7 (1965); N.Y. Civ. SERv.
LAW § 207 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
106. "Arbitration" like "collective bargaining" tends to become a platitude, given
lip service but not substance, by both legislators and study commissions. Thus, some
statutes grant collective bargaining rights without allowing the strike which would
give the rights substance and without providing sufficient controls to make the
process effective. The New York legislature, recognizing that the provisions of its
Taylor Law did not allow real collective bargaining, substituted its own platitudinous
phrase "collective negotiations." N.Y. CIV. SERv. I.Aw § 203 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
Similarly, a proposed Pennsylvania law required as a final step in negotiations that
there be "binding arbitration" except for police and firemen. But it would then
have emasculated that provision by making the arbitrator's decision purely advisory,
except with respect to determinations which did not require legislative action in order
to be effective. Proposed Pennsylvania Public Employee Bargaining Law § 807(a), reprinted in GERR No. 267, at E-5 (Oct. 21, 1968).
107. In effect, such advisory arbitration is the same as fact-finding. See, e.g., l\Ie.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, §§ 980-990 (Supp. 1968) (fire fighters); See also Proposed Pennsylvania Public Employee Bargaining Law § 807(a), reprinted in GERR No. 267, at
E-1 (Oct. 21, 1968). See generally :Belasco, supra note 86, at 533-44.
108. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9.3-.12 (1968) (arbitration binding on teachers
and on school board except as to matters "involving expenditure of money"). Cf.
Proposed Pennsylvania Public Employee Bargaining Law § 807(a), reprinted in GERR
No. 267, at E-1 (Oct. 21, 1968) (arbitration binding on employer except as to matters
requiring legislative enactment).
109. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.4-11 to -13 (1968).
ll0. The delegation of power doctrine is no longer very important in the federal
setting, but state courts have been slow to discard it. K. DAVIS, .ADMINISTRATIVE I.Aw
TREATISE § 2.15 (1968).
Ill. See text following note 144 infra.
112. See text accompanying note 145 infra.
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The first of these factors is supported by most older cases,113 but
recent cases have shown a greater acceptance of both grievance114
and, to a lesser extent, interests arbitration.115 Moreover, most of
the cases in which arbitration has been held an impermissible delegation are distinguishable from those that would arise in the present
setting in that in those cases there was no statute authorizing even
public employee bargaining, much less arbitration. Since, under
such circumstances bargaining itself could be construed as an
impermissible delegation,11 6 it followed logically that an agreement
to submit disputes to arbitration was likewise invalid. 117
The extent to which the delegation problem may preclude application of interests arbitration to public employee bargaining
disputes depends initially upon the extent to which the decision
of the arbitrator may be binding upon the governmental authority.
In the absence of a statute specifically authorizing interests arbitration it is unlikely that a governmental authority can be bound by
an arbitrator's decision. 118 Although with respect to grievance arbitration the power to agree to such arbitration may be inferred from
a collective bargaining statute,119 that logical nexus is not so apparent in the case of interests arbitration. Interests arbitration
arguably bypasses bargaining and thereby deviates altogether from
the purpose of the collective bargaining statute.120
113. See, e.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Washington
ex rel. Everett Firefighters, Local 350 v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955)
(city charter provision for compulsory arbitration of firemen's wage dispute held
unlawful delegation of power). See also Van Riper v. Traffic Tel. Workers Fedn., 2
N.J. 335, 66 A.2d 161 (1949).
114. See, e.g., Local 1226, AFSCME v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151
N.W .2d 30 (1969); Local 953, AFSCME v. Benton Harbor School Dist., Civil No.
6229(B) (Mich. Cir. Ct. for Berrien County Oct. 12, 1967), reprinted in GERR
No. 216, at E-1 (Oct. 30, 1967); Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 237 A.2d 668 (N.H.
1968).
115. See, e.g., City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn., 256 A.2d 206
(R.I. 1969). See also Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Service, 17 I.All.
L.J. 138 (1966); Note, supra note 96. Before the City of Warwick case, the authorities
usually cited in support of the validity of public employees' interests arbitration
were Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public Bldg. Serv. & Hosp. Employees, Local 113, 241
Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), and New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications
Workers of America, N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950). But those
cases are of doubtful relevance since they did not involve public employees, but private
employees engaged in critical occupations.
116. See, e.g., Railway Mail Assn. v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1943),
revd. on other grounds, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
117. See, e.g., Operating Engineers, Local 321 v. Water Works Bd., 276 Ala. 462,
163 S.2d 619 (1964). See also Note, supra note 96.
118. See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Everett Firefighters, Local 350 v. Johnson, 46
Wash. 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955); Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547
(1962).
119. See note 106 supra.
120. For the opposite view, see Note, supra note 96, at 138.

December 1969]

Comments

283

But even when there is statutory authorization for interests arbitration, that authorization raises serious delegation problems, whose
resolution depends in part upon the form of the statute. Such legislation can provide for arbitration that is (1) totally voluntary, that
is, upon the agreement of both parties; (2) semi-voluntary, that is,
upon request by a single party; or (3) compulsory. All three categories have in common certain delegation problems, which may be
divided into two general types: those concerning the delegation of
power from one branch of government to another, and those concerning the abdication of governmental responsibility to an outsider. For example, a statute which permits parties to engage in
voluntary interests arbitration might be viewed as permitting an
unconstitutional delegation from one branch of government to another, since the local executive, by agreeing to_ the arbitration, could
bind other divisions of government. However, a statute specifically
providing that arbitration would be binding upon all branches of a
local government should validate the arbitration against this delegation objection, because, to the extent that the state legislature
can control the distribution of local governmental power, it would
be similarly empowered to delegate that power within a particular
governmental unit.
But even if the arbitration decision can properly bind both the
local legislative body and the executive, its effectiveness will be
limited unless the decision is to take precedence over state restrictions on the local government's powers. For example, the scope of
employee relations in local government is often limited by state
laws controlling civil service standards or retirement plans.121 Although disputes over these matters seemingly relate to "wages and
conditions of employment" which comprise the subject matter of
bargaining under the public employee statutes,122 they are beyond
the scope of a local government's bargaining power. 123 Consequently, they would presumably also be beyond arbitration, at least
under a statute which merely permitted local governments to agree
to interests arbitration. Other state-imposed limitations may restrict
the binding ability of arbitration even as to matters more purely
local in nature. For example, when there are state restrictions on
local taxing power or on tax rates, a municipality may find it legally
impossible to comply with the economic burdens of an arbitration
decision. 124
121. For discussion of restriction on local government, see Rehmus, Constraints on
Local Governments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 919 (1969).
122. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.213 (1967); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 204
(1968).
123. See Rehmus, supra note 121, at 926-29.
124. Id. at 921-26.
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For arbitration to enjoy maximum effectiveness as a strike substitute, then, it would have to bind state government as well as
local. A recent Pennsylv~nia arbitration statute applying to disputes
with police and firemen purports to have that effect.125 But an arbitration statute so drawn would seem to be subject to the second
delegation objection, that of abdication of governmental responsibility. As it applies to the local level, that objection may be weakened if the state statute makes arbitration compulsory. A voluntary
arbitration law might be viewed as in effect permitting government
officials to abdicate their responsibility for the cost of governmental
operations. But when arbitration is compelled by law, the abdication argument loses much of its force. The local official will then
have not abdicated his responsibility; instead, his responsibility will
have been removed ~y a higher governmental authority.126
Yet the objection might be raised that the higher governmental
authority which has ordered the arbitration has itself abdicated its
responsibility by delegating it to an outside party. To the extent
that this objection has merit, however, it can be avoided if the arbitration is governmental in nature.127 Thus, arbitration might properly be conducted by a state labor board, by a public employment
board, or perhaps by a "labor court."128
But even governmental arbitration must withstand attack on
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.12 (Supp. 1969), provides that the decision
by a tripartite board of arbitration, chosen by the parties, shall be binding, and
that if legislative action is required to meet the arbitration award, the state or local
legislative body must take appropriate action within a specified period of time.
126. In some instances, it may be doubtful that the state legislature can properly
remove that local responsibility. In states whose constitutions guarantee hoine rule to
certain cities, the legislature may be constitutionally unable to alter the allocation of
responsibility within city governments by requiring those governments to submit their
labor disputes to binding arbitration. Where home rule is not constitutionally guaranteed, however, home rule charters will not bar arbitration. See, e.g., PA. STAT,
ANN. tit. 43, § 217.9 (Supp. 1969) (arbitration statute applicable despite any existing
or future home rule charters).
127. In the recent case of City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn.,
256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that arbitration
by a tripartite panel with the third party chosen by the parties to bargaining was
governmental in nature and thus not an impermissible delegation of governmental
authority. While the result in that case may or may not be desirable, the court's
reasoning is wholly tautological. The court answered the argument that the arbitration constituted a delegation to a private person by reasoning that since the statute
authorized whomever might be chosen as arbitrator to receive a portion of the state's
sovereign power, that person was therefore made a public officer. As such, he was clearly
not a private person, and hence there was no impermissible delegation of governmental
authority to a private person. 256 A.2d at 210-11.
128. Cf. NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 48-820 (1968) (arbitration by court of industrial relations). See generally Fleming, The Labor Court Idea, 65 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1551 (1967).
Such a court might be analogous to the Civil Service Commissions, which have authority to determine wages, hours, and conditions of employment, are semi-autonomous, and have not been held an invalid delegation of legislative responsibility.
See Shenton, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Seroice, 17 LAB. L.J. 1118, 143
(1966).
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grounds of improper delegation of legislative authority. The traditional means by which a legislative delegation is justified is by
including in the delegating statute sufficient "standards" to guide
the body which is to exercise the legislative authority. 129 In the public employee situation, it is unclear what these standards must be.
Standards developed in cases involving nonpublic employees
engaged in critical occupations, such as communications workers130
or hospital employees, 131 are of uncertain relevance, because the
cases involved substantially different issues than those in a public
employee arbitration case. 132 In light of the apparent propensity
129. In New Jersey v. Traffic Tel. Workers' Fedn., 2 N.J. 335, 66 A.2d 616 (1949), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a statute requiring compulsory arbitration
of labor disputes in public communications was invalid because of a lack of standards.
But an amended version of the statute, which included standards to guide the decision
of the arbitrator, was upheld in New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication '\Vorkers
of America, N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950). See also City of
Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn., 256 A.2d at 210 (R.I. 1969); K. DAVIS,
.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.15 (1958).
130. In the context of public utility disputes, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found to be adequate, those standards which required the arbitrator to consider: (1) the
interests and welfare of the public; (2) a comparison of wages, hours, and conditions
of employment of the employees involved in the arbitration proceedings with those of
other employees doing comparable work; and (3) "[o]ther factors ••• traditionally taken
into consideration in determination of wages, hours, and conditions of employment
through voluntary collective bargaining." New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication
Workers of America, N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, 5 N.J. 354, 371, 75 A.2d 721, 729 (1950).
131. In Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public Bldg. Serv. &: Hosp. Employees, Local 113,
241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), the Minnesota Supreme Court permitted even
vaguer standards, finding sufficient the statutory statement of general labor policy:
to protect and promote the interests of public, employees, and employers alike;
to promote industrial peace, regular and adequate income for employees, and uninterrupted production of goods and services; to reduce menace to health and
welfare, and morals ..• arising from economic insecurity due to stoppages •••
of business and employment.
241 Minn. at 546, 6·1 N.W.2d at 30-31.
132. One issue involved in nongovernmental employee cases concerns the general
propriety of arbitration as a means of deciding justifiable disputes. See New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of America, N.J. Traffic Div. No. 55, 5 N.J.
354, 75 A.2d 72 (1950). At one time, private sector arbitration was viewed as an infringement upon the judiciary. See, e.g., Boston Printing Pressman's Union v. Potter
Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass.), afjd., 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 817 (1957). See generally Cushman, Voluntary Arbitration of New Contract Terms
-A Forum in Search of a Dispute, 16 LAB. L.J. 765 (1967). Another issue in such cases
concerns compensation for governmental "taking" of a private employee's right to
strike. In Fairview Hosp. Assn. v. Public Bldg. Serv. &: Hosp. Employees, Local 113,
241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954), the court felt that the use of arbitration was a
necessary substitute for the employee's relinquishment of the right to strike. The distinction between that situation and the governmental employment situation is thus
clear, for the governmental employee has no "right" to strike, whereas the private
employee has a recognized right, albeit a limited one. The private employee's right
to strike resembles a property right subject to taking under the police power only in
a manner consistent with fourteenth amendment due process requirements-that is,
the right must not be "arbitrarily and unjustly withdrawn," and there should be "a
substantial and reasonable substitute for the rights withdrawn." 241 Minn. at 543, 64
N.W.2d at 27. Hence, in the private sector, a provision for compulsory arbitration
takes on the nature of compensation for loss of the right to strike.
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of some state courts to find improper delegations in arbitration of
public employee bargaining disputes,133 it seems unlikely that the
vague standards developed in the nongovernmental context134 would
be adequate.
Statutory standards to guide and control arbitration vary
widely, ranging from none at all in Pennsylvania135 to highly
detailed standards in Michigan136 and Rhode Island. 137 Some indication of what standards will be accepted for arbitration of government employee disputes appeared in a recent Rhode Island
case. 138 In that case, the state supreme court upheld compulsory
arbitration of a firemen's wage dispute, basing its decision on a statute which required that a tripartite arbitration panel consider as
factors: (I) a comparison with prevailing wage rates and conditions
of employment in building trades in the local area; (2) comparison
with firemen's wage rates in surrounding towns of comparable size;
and (3) the interest and welfare of the public, hazards of the employment, and qualifications and skills of the employees. 139
The criteria which have been developed in reference to the use of a
fact finder may offer some additional guide as to what standards will
suffice in the arbitration context. Only three states furnish statutory
criteria for the fact finder. Statutes in Maine and Rhode Island concentrate on comparison with private employment situations, with only
a vague reference to "the public interest and welfare," whereas Minnesota's statute appears more applicable to the delegation problem
which is encountered when the arbitration is to be binding. 140 Under
Minnesota's statute, the fact-finding panel is required to consider
tax limitations imposed by charter on the local government, wagehour comparisons with employees of other governmental agencies,
internal consistency of treatment of employees in the several classes, 141
133. See, e.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Washington
ex rel. Everett Firefighters, Local 350 v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955).
134. See notes 130-31 supra.
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 1969).
136. MICH. Co?.n>. LAws ANN. § 423.239 (Supp. 1969).
137. R.I. GEN. STATS. ANN. §§ 28-9.1-10 (Supp. 1969).
138. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Firemen's Assn., 256 A.2d 206 (R.I.
1969).
139. 256 A.2d at 211-12.
140. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 989 (Supp. 1968) (fire fighters); R.I. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-9.3-9 (1968) (teachers); R.I. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-9.4-10 (1968) (municipal employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.57(4) (1966). See generally Krinsky, Public Employment Fact-Finding in Fourteen States, 17 LABOR L.J. 532, 539 (1966).
141. This consideration is important in light of the "leapfrogging" situation con•
fronting municipal employers-with a multiplicity of bargaining units, a settlement
with one is likely to set the floor for negotiations with other groups. If arbitration is
to be binding but is to stay within the limits of a city's tax structure, it will be
necessary for the arbitrator to consider the peripheral as well as the immediate effects
of his decision. A decision which grants a large pay increase to police, for example,
may work to the relative detriment of another group in later negotiations, because
the city may be then financially incapable of giving a comparable increase.
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and other factors normally considered by the governmental agency
in its employment relationships.142
Standards such as those in the Minnesota statute appear to satisfy
best the delegation requirement, as long as the arbitration is done
by a governmental agency and procedural safeguards are provided.
Those safeguards might include -written findings by the arbitrator
and the availability of judicial review to ensure adherence to the
statutory criteria.143 By requiring consideration of the tax and
charter limitations on the local government, such standards would
preclude arbitration decisions which require state legislative action
-a limitation which is necessary to avoid the argument that a legislature cannot bind itself to enact future legislation to be suggested
by an outside party. In effect, then, an arbitration statute limited to
matters within the power of the local governmental unit restricts
arbitration to those matters over which there is local collective bargaining authority. Arbitration so restricted is not completely satisfactory as an alternative to the strike power, for while such arbitration cannot change a state law restricting local government, the
strike and its attendant political measures can bring about that
change.144 However, it is not yet certain that in order to overcome
objections based on the grounds of improper delegation, arbitration
must be restricted to this degree.
Even if there is no legal obstacle, the wisdom of relying upon
arbitration to achieve a balance of bargaining power might still
be questioned. Arbitration, like fact-finding, presents the possibility that the parties ·will not really negotiate, but rather will prefer to rely upon the arbitrator. That fear seems especially relevant
to the public employee situation in which the bargainers may be
inexperienced.
Moreover, the policy considerations behind the argument that
the government's resort to arbitration is an abdication of its re142. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.57(4) (1966).
143. A related question concerns the extent to which judicial review should be
available. The Pennsylvania statute expressly prohibits judicial review. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 217.7 (Supp. 1969). The Michigan arbitration statute, on the other hand,
provides for judicial review, but only on the questions whether the panel exceeded
its jurisdiction, whether it entered an order unsupported by substantial evidence in
the record, or whether it entered an order procured by fraud or other unlawful
means. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.242 (1967).
144. That fact is exemplified by the New York transit workers strike under the
Condon-Wadlin Law, Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as
amended, Law of April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). The
transit authority was barred by state law from granting any pay increase whatsoever
to those who had engaged in the strike. But the trains were stopped, and the city
was paralyzed. The ensuing political repercussions produced what was in effect a
special legislative dispensation-a wage settlement which was a legislated exception
to the Condon-Wadlin law. Arbitration could not have produced a settlement under
those conditions; only the political coercion of the strike produced the necessary
statutory change. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931, 933
(1969).
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sponsibility apply even though the delegation is kept within constitutional limits. By relying upon arbitration, a governmental official
can avoid an unpleasant decision for which he would othenvise be
politically accountable. Although the effect may not necessarily be
the raising of taxes by an unaccountable arbitrator, the decision
may well affect the allocation of governmental expenditures within
a political unit.145 Such a decision arguably should remain with
those who are politically accountable for it.
In light of the possible adverse effects of arbitration, it seems
advisable that it be used sparingly in resolving labor disputes in
public employment. Perhaps it should remain limited to employee
groups such as policemen and firemen, for whom the strike is completely unacceptable. 146 But in whatever situations it is used, arbitration cannot be fully adequate as a strike substitute. Nor should
it be viewed as the exclusive means of dispute resolution. Rather, it
should be part of a comprehensive bargaining scheme in which
arbitration, or preferably, the threat of arbitration, could prevent
either party from having an overwhelming bargaining advantage,
and could encourage the parties to reach an equitable settlement.
D. The Unfair Labor Practice Proceeding
Another possible device which may prove useful in promoting
effective collective bargaining for public employees while avoiding
strikes is the unfair labor practice proceeding. The remedy provided by such a proceeding is potentially important, particularly in
a comprehensive collective bargaining program. Like arbitration,
however, it is presently available in only a few states; and even
where the remedy can be sought, as in Michigan, it may be available only to the union.147
Typically, unfair labor practice procedures are modeled after
those of the NLRA,148 and permit an aggrieved party to bring actions before a quasi-judicial body, charging the violation of specific
statutory prohibitions. That procedure is most effective in performing such functions as enforcing recognition and enjoining antiunion
discrimination. But because of timing and enforcement problems, it
has limited usefulness at the bargaining stage. Since the administrative machinery is incapable of acting on short notice, charges filed
145. This danger could perhaps be partially alleviated by the utilization of arbi•
tration standards which seek to prevent disrupting the relative standings of employee
groups. See note 141 supra.
146. See, e.g., the Pennsylvania and Michigan arbitration statutes dealing with
police and firemen. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (Supp. 1969); l\lICH. COlllP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.231 (1967).
147. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 (1967).
148. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). See generally Smith, Unfair Labor Practices
in Public Employment, GERR No. 268, at E-1 (Oct. 28, 1968).
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during the course of bargaining are unlikely to be disposed of until
the contract deadline has passed and the public has suffered the
adverse consequences of the parties' disagreement. Moreover, even
if the case is decided in time, the enforcement powers of the adjudicating body are often inadequate, particularly when the charge
alleges a failure to bargain in good faith. The Michigan State Labor
Mediation Board, for example, is not legally empowered to order a
settlement in that situation; instead, enforcement is limited to
issuing "cease and desist" orders, the continued violation of which
may result in contempt penalties.149 The threat of such restraining
orders may help to equalize bargaining power, but the delay before
sanctions are imposed renders that threat less effective as a preventive measure.
Nevertheless, the unfair labor practice proceeding may accomplish a useful publicity function similar to that of a fact finder's
recommendations. When time permits a decision to be rendered
during the course of bargaining, posting or publication of that decision may be ordered, 150 and the resulting pressure from public
opinion can exert a beneficial influence on subsequent negotiations.
If the fact-finding process is also available, however, it seems
wasteful to seek an unfair labor practice remedy whose primary
advantage is already available thrqugh fact-finding. Of course, the
remedy itself is not useless, but its shortcomings point out the necessity of developing more effective methods of using such bargaining
controls.
IV. THE

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO LABOR RELATIONS
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

A. Application of Collective Bargaining Aids
The basic objections to the use of aids to collective bargaining
is that they are ineffective because of poor timing, inadequate
staffing, haphazard application, and the absence of a comprehensive
and integrated approach to the settlement of labor disputes. If the
use of aids to bargaining, such as mediation and fact-finding, depends upon the request of one or both of the parties, those procedures may not be invoked at all,151 or may be invoked at such a
late stage in the negotiations that they cannot be effective.152 Conse149. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 (1967).
150. For example, the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, in holding that a school
board's practice of mailing its latest offer directly to teachers was an unfair labor
practice, ordered its remedial order to be posted in the school. Morenci Educ. Assn.,
No. C-68, H-96 (Mich. Lab. Med. Bd. Dec. 12, 1968), reprinted in GERR No. 281, at
B-2 Gan. 27, 1969).
151. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
152. For example, when the fact-finding procedure is not invoked by a party until
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quently, state statutes should establish governmental regulatory
bodies, authorized to provide services to aid bargaining, and empowered to require their use when agreement has not been reached
by a specified time prior to the contract or budget submission deadline.1csa
.
In the past, the administration of bargaining aids furnished by
public agencies has been hampered by a lack of the competent personnel and adequate staffing necessary to provide prompt and efficient implementation. After enactment of Michigan's PERA, for
example, the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, which is responsible for furnishing mediation and fact-finding services and for
handling recognition and election proceedings, found itself so inundated with both types of requests that it was often unable to meet
the demand.154 Undeniably, providing better services means increased cost; but in light of the cost of strikes which those procedures are designed to prevent, spending more for prevention is
preferable and justifiable.
The need for prompt service, competent personnel, and an integrated approach to public employment labor problems lends support to the proposal that such services should be rendered by a state
agency specializing in labor relations in the public sector. Such an
approach can offer the advantage of specialization. Certain aspects of
public employment, such as the political element, the strike prohibia strike is imminent, it is unlikely that there will be time for the fact finder to make
an adequate investigation and a thoughtful report. Instead, the process will tum into
intensive mediation, concentrated on averting the impending strike, rather than on
considering the merits of the dispute. That situation is said to be present in Michigan.
See Howlett, supra note 82.
153. Mandatory application of outside bargaining aids was suggested in the Michigan Report, supra note 84, at 8-9, and in the Pennsylvania Governor's proposed statute, Pa. H.B. No. 2834, § 801 (1968), reprinted in GERR No. 267, at E-1, E-3 (Oct.
21, 1968). In New York, the PERB has discretion to order mediation and fact-finding,
but is not required to do so at any specified time. N.Y. C1v. SERv. LAw § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
A drawback to the application of bargaining aids on a timetable basis is that the
certainty of their availability may impair the bargaining process. That objection is
particularly troublesome if arbitration is available, for arbitration is most helpful to
bargaining when its availability is uncertain. The threat of arbitration can help
balance bargaining power, but neither party can cease bargaining in reliance
upon its availability. This uncertainty can be achieved by making arbitration discretionary with a governmental regulatory body, such as New York's PERB. N.Y. C1v.
SERv. LAw § 205 (McKinney Supp. 1968). Of course, uncertainty concerning the avail•
ability of arbitration may be difficult to maintain in the case of critical employees
such as police and firemen. But even in that situation, reliance upon its availability
may be discouraged by providing a comprehensive bargaining program aimed at
making arbitration unnecessary, and by making arbitration relatively less attractive
by having the parties bear the costs of the service.
154. In 1967, for example, the Michigan State Labor Mediation Board received
requests for mediation at double the 1966 rate, and it received representation petitions at a rate four times that of the previous year. The volume of cases created a
severe backlog. See Michigan Report, App. E, supra note 84.
·
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tion, limitations on local governmental authority, and elements of
social conflict serve to distinguish it sharply from its private sector
counterpart. Consequently, specialized expertise beyond that acquired in private sector practice is required to deal with public sector
labor disputes. A mediator of disputes in the public employment
field, for example, must be prepared to deal with inexperienced parties11111 and with employees who may be more militant,156 and more
concerned with political and social issues than are their private sector
counterparts.157 Similarly, fact finders and arbitrators, in order to
deal adequately with a labor dispute in the public sector may need
special skills in addition to those required in the private sector. At
present, most fact finders tend to be either mediators, in which case
they may not apply the necessary quasi-judicial approach,158 or arbitrators, whose experience tends to be in private employment grievance arbitration.159 Neither experience necessarily prepares one to
weigh the considerations present in public employment.
Moreover, dispatch in the fact-finding and arbitration procedures is essential in the public sector. While delay is irritating in
private grievance situations, it can be calamitous in public employment, in which the avoidance of strikes assumes overriding importance. Independent arbitrators and fact finders do tend to be more
prompt when they are functioning in critical public employee labor
disputes than they do in private sector disputes.160 But that promptness could be more certain if the aids are provided by an adequately
staffed state agency, aware of the need for promptness.
Another consideration supporting the establishment of a state
agency to administer the procedures which aid bargaining is the
need for some degree of consistency in decisions. When outside
parties are chosen by the bargainers, the individual biases of those
155. Howlett, Michigan's New Public Employee Relations Act, 45 MICH. ST. B.J.
14, 16 (1966).
·
156. There is some indication that public employees tend to be more militant
than members of long-established private industry unions. That militancy is illustrated by the frequent rejections of negotiated settlements by rank-and-file public
employees. See Kheel, supra note 144, at 934.
157. Public employee disputes often involve noneconomic issues. For instance, in
the Ocean Hill-Brownsville dispute, and in the Memphis Sanitation strike, elements
of social conflict predominated. For an indication of the connection between public
employee unionism and the civil rights movement, see 17th Convention of American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, GERR No. 248, B-3, B-4 to 6
aune 10, 1968).
158. See Statement by William Saxton at the 22d Annual Meeting of National
Academy of Arbitrators, GERR No. 283 at B-1, B-3 (Feb. 10, 1969).
159. Cf. Coulson, Labor Arbitration-The Insecure Profession, in PROC. OF N.Y.U.
20rH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 131 (1967).
160. Cf. Coulson, Spring Checkup on Labor Arbitration Procedure, 16 LAB. L.J.
259, 260-61 (1965).
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parties tend to produce diverse decisions.161 Such diversity is particularly harmful in public employment where a settlement in one
dispute may affect both other employees of the governmental unit
involved162 and employees of other governmental units. 163 In view
of the possible external effects of a single settlement, then, it is
desirable for the state to seek some consistency in its fact-finding
and arbitration decisions. That consistency can be gained, to some
extent, by the setting of criteria for decisions164 but greater consistency is obtainable if the fact-finding and arbitration are done by
a single group. The consistent body of precedent produced in this
manner will enable parties to determine ahead of time the probable
outcome of resorting to outside aid, and, as a result, more disputes
could be settled without invoking such aid.
B. The Use of Sanctions To Encourage Bargaining

In order to achieve consistent results from the application by a
state agency of aids to bargaining, it may be necessary to provide
certain sanctions to support those aids. Moreover, in a comprehensive approach, the punitive remedies of the strike prohibition
may play an additional wle, since use of preventive aids, by itself,
may fail to achieve an adequate balance of bargaining power. Sue161. Arbitration services provide extensive records on individual arbitrators, and
on the basis of those records, parties seek the arbitrators most likely to furnish a
favorable decision. Reliance on such past records is so extensive that a young arbitra•
tor finds it almost impossible to break into the field. Coulson, supra note 159, at 133.
162. The limitation on the amount of public funds available to satisfy employee
wage demands in a given year means that a disproportionate increase won by a single
group of employees will result in fewer funds for other employee groups. The dif•
ficulties in this regard are aggravated by the political characteristics of public employment. Indeed, to the extent that the fundamental political impulse to maximize one's
share of societal wealth is reflected in public employee attitudes, any settlement which
threatens to reduce a particular group's share will be most strenuously resisted. Thus,
a disproportionately large settlement for any particular group can both unfairly deprive other groups and lead to greater intransigence on the part of those groups. The
problem is further aggravated by the multiplicity of bargaining units with which a local
government must deal. See Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service:
The Problem of Proliferation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1001 (1969); Slavney, The Public Employee-How Shall He Be Represented?, GERR No. 269, at E-1 (Nov. 4, 1968).
163. An employee group's settlement with one public employer tends to set the
pace for bargaining by its counterparts in neighboring communities. This is particularly true in the case of school teachers, for in that area the central bargaining issue
is often the comparison with surrounding school districts. Thus, in the recent strike
by school teachers in Plymouth, Michigan, the major question was not whether to
compare salaries with other communities, but rather with which communities salaries
should be compared. Meeting of Plymouth Community School Board, Sept. 8,
1969. There is a rational basis for treating the issue in this way: particularly in
suburban areas in which school districts proliferate within a small geographical area,
employers are relatively fungible, and a district's failure to meet the standard of its
neighbors may result in the loss of its teachers.
164. The setting of criteria is done by statute in Maine, :Minnesota, and Rhode
Island. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
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cess in negotiations often depends upon a mutual desire to avoid a
costly strike,165 and in the public sector, the relative cost of a strike
to the parties involved is sometimes highly unequal. For example,
a strike by public school teachers which merely delays the fall opening of school represents little or no cost to the teachers, since state
laws require a minimum number of school days per year and accordingly teachers will usually receive a full year's salary despite
the delayed school opening. When the slight cost to teachers is
compared with the record of substantial pay increases won by such
delays, the tactic appears quite attractive indeed.166 That situation
is in direct contrast to the one which arises in most private sector
strikes, in which strike time represents a direct economic loss to
the striking employees. When, as is often the case in the public
sector, a strike presents little or no threat of economic loss to employees, it may be desirable to increase the cost of striking and
thereby to encourage settlement. Indeed, in order to achieve an
equitable balance of bargaining power, some means of cost-equalization is essential.
A possible cost-equalization approach is to allow damage suits
by the employer against the union. 167 Such an approach, however,
far from promoting a balance of bargaining between the parties,
would probably only aggravate any existing imbalance. In situations in which the union possesses the preponderance of power, the
employer would be unlikely to invoke the damage remedy for fear
of exacerbating relations; and when the employer holds the power,
the availability of such a further remedy would merely increase his
advantage.
Another means by which cost-equalization might be achieved is
through fines against individual strikers. But that approach seems
to reflect older attitudes inconsistent ·with the new bargaining
laws, and direct fines could appear to striking employees to be arbitrary and punitive and consequently could prompt greater intransigence in response. Moreover, it is questionable whether sanctions against individuals contribute to a balancing of bargaining
power between the parties. But even if such sanctions can promote
a balance of power, they should be applied only to the extent necessary to offset an excessive union advantage. Such an approach is
165. Kheel Report, supra note 38, at 30.
166. In September 1967, for example, the Detroit Federation of Teachers engaged in a thirteen-day strike. The settlement then reached provided for a shorter
school year, smaller class size, and a two-year contract for teachers with an increase
in base pay from $5,800 to $7,500. GERR No. 210, at B-1 (Sept. 18, 1967).
167. The employer is probably the only party who could sue, because a member of
the general public injured by a strike of vital public services has no standing to sue
the union. Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 51,525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1966) (decided under Condon-Wadlin Law).
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consistent with the goals of strike prevention and equitable settlements. Where individual penalties are presently required, however,
their application is across-the-board and bears no rational relationship to the power of the union, or to the equities of the situation.168
Although a more discriminating application of individual penalties might contribute more to equalizing the costs of failure to
reach a negotiated settlement, it is clear that that goal can be better
achieved by a flexible application of penalties against the union
organization as a whole. One such approach is to assess fines against
the union for each day that its workers are on strike. 169 A related
device, and one which is potentially very effective, is the suspension
of the union's privilege of dues check-off. 170
168. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw § 210 (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch.
24, § 8, [1969] N.Y. Laws 42 (McKinney Supp. April IO, 1969).
169. That device has been less than fully successful in solving New York City's
extended labor crises. See, e.g., Montana, supra note 38; Kheel, supra note 38. Part
of the reason for its failure is the militant reaction it engenders on the part of unions.
For example, the fine of $220,000 levied against the New York United Federation of
Teachers-amounting to only a few cents per teacher per strike day-has been condemned by George Meany, who has expressed the AFL-CIO's sympathy by instituting
a fund-raising campaign so the UFT will not have to "bear the burden alone." GERR
No. 283, at B-8 (Feb. IO, 1969). The recent interest of established big labor for the
plight of the public employee may be a product of statistics showing the contrast
between the stagnant membership roles of private labor organizations as compared
to the burgeoning membership of public employee unions. See Note, supra note 68, at
549; Donoian, The AFGE and the AFSCME: Labor's Hope for the Future?, 18 LAn.
L.J. 727 (1967).
Another reason for the failure of the device of using fines might be its inability to
achieve an adequate equalization because of statutory limitations on fines. Prior to the
amendment in 1969, the Taylor Law's limitations on fines against unions that violated
injunctions meant that a large union could, in effect, purchase the right to strike by
paying fines amounting to perhaps twenty-five cents per member per strike day. GERR
No. 283, at B-5 (Feb. IO, 1969). The recent amendment removed the limitations on fines,
and the fine is now to be fixed at the discretion of the court. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW
§ 751(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
If the fines are to be productive toward the goal of balancing bargaining power,
the amount of any such fine should reflect, among other considerations, the ability
of the union to pay. Neither a heavy fine against a small union nor an insignificant
fine against a large union can effectuate that goal. The enforcement provisions of the
New York law include as a relevant factor in assessing fines the union's ability to
pay. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
170. The effectiveness of a loss of dues check-off privileges has been discounted
by David Seldon, President of American Federation of Teachers. According to him,
the penalty of loss of check-off would mean perhaps a 15% reduction in dues collections, but "[w)e can always raise dues if we have to." GERR No. 282, at AA-6
(Feb. 3, 1969). Recent New York experience seems to indicate the contrary. Following the teachers' strikes during the decentralization disputes, the UFT's dues
check-off privilege was suspended, and the PERB stated that it would not reinstate
check-off until the union gave a no-strike pledge. Surprisingly, the militant union
president, Albert Shanker, has given that pledge. The suspension reportedly cost the
union some one million dollars in lost dues. GERR No. 313, at B-19 (Sept. 8, 1969). The
effectiveness of loss of check-off was also indicated when a New York court, after a
strike, assessed an $80,000 fine and a suspension of check-off privileges against sanitationmen. Union spokesmen were said to view the check-off loss as the more onerous
penalty, because the union's monthly dues intake of $1,080,000 would then depend upon
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There are other punitive sanctions possible, such as the loss of
representation and punishment of leaders, but they are likely to be
self-defeating. Loss of representation can be of no use in balancing
the bargaining power except perhaps as a threat; the use of that
extreme remedy does not contribute to a balancing, but simply
removes one of the bargainers. Moreover, such loss of representation
would hardly remove the strike threat, since a substantial number
of strikes are concerned with the very issue of representation. 171
Similarly, punishment of union leaders is likely to have only a negative effect. Since its application comes after an impasse-strike situation has occurred, the punishment will very probably harden the
union's resistance. In addition, the opportunity for martyrdom
afforded to a militant leader may serve to intensify the dispute.172
On the whole, punitive and enforcement measures may have
some value as a means of balancing relative bargaining power in
situations in which a strike would be less costly to the union than
to the governmental employer. When punitive measures are applied in such instances, they can probably help to shorten a strike
and possibly to deter future strikes. 173 But if punitive measures are
indiscriminately applied, without regard to their effects on the bargaining process, the ultimate result will almost certainly be to
worsen labor relations by increasing the unions' militancy. Still
worse, an undiscriminating application will probably aggravate any
existing imbalance of power, since the measures will have their
greatest effect on the already weak unions and will leave the powerful unions substantially unaffected. 174
voluntary contributions from each employee. GERR No. 232, at B-9 (Feb. 19, 1968).
Even if Seldon's view is accurate, however, the penalty can still perform its function
in balancing bargaining power. A strike will, in any event, be more costly to the union
because of the loss of check-off; and thus potential gains from the strike are more
likely to be discounted in advance.
171. But if the only penalty is loss of the right to be the exclusive bargaining
representative, rather than loss of the right to represent at all, the effect may be somewhat less detrimental to labor relations. The employees would retain bargaining rights,
but representation would be nonexclusive. Such an arrangement generally produces
weak unions and might result in an excessive advantage for the employer. On the
other hand, the result might be an increase in militancy as competing groups vie continuously for the employee's support.
172. The likelihood of that result was demonstrated by the New York City experience. Montana, supra note 38, at 275-78. The problem has continued under the Taylor
Law. See Kheel, supra note 38, at 8-12. The practice of imprisoning union officials is
deplored by almost all commentators including the Taylor Committee which advocated harsher penalties. Taylor Comm. Recommendations, Jan. 23, 1969, GERR No.
283, at G-1, G-6 (Feb. 10, 1969). But the committee views the question as one for
the judiciary to decide in evaluating its contempt process. Id. at G-6.
173. But see note 169 supra.
174. In the application of New York's former Condon-Wadlin Law, for example,
its penalties were invoked only five times prior to 1965, and then only against upstate
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C. Role of the Injunction in the Comprehensive Approach
A potentially more flexible approach to problems of balancing
bargaining power is offered by the court injunction. Although the
injunction has traditionally been just another weapon for a powerful public employer, it could, if it were applied selectively, reinforce
the bargaining goals of a comprehensive scheme of labor relations
in the public sector. For example, an injunction could be made
mandatory for strikes which occur before the parties have complied
with certain required steps in the bargaining process.175 Courts
could be required to determine, before issuing an injunction, that
an employer has "clean hands" and otherwise satisfies the traditional
criteria for equitable relief.176 The judicial proceeding could be
further integrated with the bargaining aids by requiring the court
to consider a fact finder's report in disposing of the request for injunction. If the availability of injunctive relief were dependent
upon such standards, both parties would be encouraged to comply
in good faith with statutory bargaining procedures.
In some situations, however, there are inherent limitations upon
the utility of the injunctive remedy to complement a comprehensive
bargaining scheme. For instance, if the government, engaged in a
unions which generally lack political power. Moreover, in New York City the Law
was deliberately not invoked thirteen times, and was partially applied twice. Hilde•
brand, supra note 14, at 140. It seems doubtful that a punitive measure by itself
could ever be fully effective against a powerful union. Indeed, to make punitive mea•
sures more effective, perhaps criminal penalties are required. In this connection,
federal law provides that a striking governmental employee may be guilty of a felony
and may receive up to a year's imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. 5 U.S.C. §§ 118p(3),
118r (1964). Yet even so severe a penalty might be of limited effectiveness, especially
in light of increasing union militancy; the federal law did not prevent the postal
unions from repealing their traditional renunciation of the right to strike. GERR No.
258, at A·l (Aug. 19, 1968). Nor did it prevent the air traffic controllers from engaging
in a "sick out." GERR No. 302, at A-9 (June 23, 1969). Moreover, as the severity of
the sanction increases, the likelihood of its enforcement decreases, since no governmental employer even remotely concerned with political survival is likely to brand
a striker as a felon.
175. Michigan Report, supra note 84, at 16.
176. Id. The court in School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 327, 157
N.W.2d 206, 211 (1968), suggests this criterion for weighing injunctive relief.
However, the approach was rejected outright by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Board of Educ. of Union Beach v. New Jersey Educ. Assn., 53 N.J. 29, 43, 247 A.2d
867, 875 (1968). In that case the court held that lack of "clean hands" was no bar
to injunctive relief when public welfare might be harmed. There are other difficulties,
too, with the suggested approach. A court determination of whether a plaintiff has
bargained in good faith might tend to infringe upon the determination of an unfair
practice by the body initially responsible for that determination-in Michigan, the
State Labor Mediation Board. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.215 (1967). Yet, a court's
determination of this issue at the time of a requested injunction may be necessary if
the good faith requirement is to have any balancing effect. Indeed, because unfair
labor practice proceedings are notoriously slow, a prompt judicial determination may
be crucial if the injunctive remedy is to have a positive influence on the bargaining
process.
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dispute with police or firemen, does not comply with its statutory duty to bargain in good faith, injunctive relief should theoretically not be available to it, since the availability of such relief
is to encourage the employer to bargain in good faith. But because
of the nature of the occupation involved, a strike would be wholly
unacceptable, and a court would have to grant an injunction despite
the employer's lack of good faith in bargaining. Recognition of
such limitations on the use of injunctions, however, does not militate against the selective application of that remedy. Instead, it
implies that there should be special provisions, such as compulsory
arbitration, for critical occupations.
D. Administration of a Comprehensive Program of

Bargaining Aids and Controls
Since application both of sanctions and of aids to collective bargaining should be aimed at the dual goals of equitable settlements
and the prevention of strikes through an approximate balancing of
bargaining power, it is of utmost importance that there be administrative machinery capable of effective and consistent pursuit
of those goals. Previous portions of this Comment have suggested
that the scheme of bargaining aids and controls should be administered by a state regulatory agency perhaps similar to New
York's PERB.177 Because of the need for a comprehensive and consistent approach, that agency should also have primary responsibility for implementation of enforcement sanctions. It should be
empowered to assess fines for strike activities and to suspend checkoff privileges.178 The criteria for assessing penalties should be
enumerated in the statute creating the agency and should be consistent with the aim of promoting an equitable balance. Thus, the
statute could require that the amount of a fine or the duration of a
suspension be increased if the union had not bargained in good
faith, had gone on strike prior to exhausting supplementary procedures, or had engaged in an unfair labor practice. Similarly, it
could provide that penalties for strike activity be lessened if the
employer had failed to bargain in good faith or had otherwise been
guilty of unfair labor practices. In assessing penalties, the regulatory agency should also consider the report of the fact finder con177. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 205 (McKinney Supp. 1968). See note 88 supra and ac•
companying text.
178. The Taylor Law presently gives the PERB power to suspend check-off [N.Y.
CIV. SERV. I.Aw § 210(3)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24, § 8, [1969)
N.Y. Laws 44 (McKinney Supp. April IO, 1969)], but fines may be levied only by a
court, and then only for violation of an antistrike injunction [N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw
§ 212(2}(a) (McKinney Supp. 1965), as amended, ch. 24, § 12, [1969] N.Y. Laws 47
(McKinney Supp. April IO, 1969)], not for the strike itself.
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cerning abuses of good faith by each party, and it should take into
account the size of the union and its ability to pay. 179
The determination of penalties should be made in an administrative proceeding, with judicial review limited either to
enforcement of the agency's order or to appellate consideration of
whether the agency had abused its discretion. The suggested approach would offer the advantage of developing a specialized body
of administrative decisions to apply to future disputes and to serve
as guidelines for the parties to those disputes. If, for example, the
parties know that under certain circumstances, penalties definitely
will be imposed or a particular remedy will or will not be available,
they can act to their best advantage. Assuming that the proposed
scheme is successful in its design and application, that course of
action would be to bargain in good faith and, it is hoped, to settle.
Another benefit of having a state agency responsible for administration is that the agency would relieve the courts of the
burden of imposing sanctions for strikes. Excessive reliance on
judicial enforcement appears to be at least partially responsible for
the Taylor Law's lack of success in New York.180 Under that law,
the courts are enmeshed in the strike dispute from the beginning.
When a strike occurs, the local government is required to seek an
injunction181 and the court is required to grant it. 182 Fines are imposed for violation of the court order, not for the strike per se. 183
Since any continued strike activity is categorized as an affront to
judicial authority, the courts, not surprisingly, find it necessary to
apply contempt powers, with the result that union leaders are sent
to jail.184 Such incarceration is almost universally deplored as
counter-productive,185 but that result must be expected if the contempt process is relied on to effectuate strike prevention.
By withdrawing the imposition of fines from the contempt function of the courts, a state would free the judiciary to exercise its authority in a more appropriate manner, namely, in granting injunc179. The Taylor Law currently requires courts to take such factors into account in
determining fines against the union. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751(2)(a) (Supp. 1969), as
amended, ch. 24, § 12, [1969] N.Y. Laws 47 (McKinney Supp. April IO, 1969).
180. The manner in which an injunction is required continues under the Taylor
Law unchanged from that under Condon-Wadlin, and it was that feature of the old
law which was at least partly responsible for its demise. See Montana, supra note 38,
K.heel, supra note 38.
181. N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw § 211 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
182. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
183. N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW § 212(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1968), as amended, ch. 24,
§ 12, [1969) N.Y. Laws 47 (McKinney Supp. April 10, 1969).
184. See K.heel Report, supra note 38, at 9.
185. Id. See also Taylor Comm. Recommendations, Jan. 23, 1969, GERR No.
283, at G•l (Feb. 10, 1969).
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tive relief in emergency situations and in enforcing orders of the
agency. Moreover, if injunctive relief is predicated upon traditional
equitable criteria, and if the imposition of strike fines is divorced
from the contempt process, respect for the judicial process should
be enhanced.
If the imposition of sanctions is thus bifurcated, it will become
necessary to ensure that disposition by the courts is consistent with
the rest of the scheme for labor relations in the public sector. The
aims of the law could be impaired, for example, if a court were to
grant an injunction without due regard to the equities of the situation. Conversely, a court's refusal to issue an injunction in a critical
situation could harm the public and could coerce a public employer
to accept a settlement that is heavily weighted against him. Hence,
an important consideration is determining which court should have
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Since local courts are apt to
be more familiar with the complexities of the situation than are
distant or specialized courts, those local courts appear to provide the
more appropriate forum. 186 Considerations of convenience and
flexibility support local court jurisdiction.187 On the other hand,
when one of the parties has undue leverage because of its local
political muscle, that power may influence a local court, at least in
a state where judges are elected locally. But that consideration
should not be crucial in determining which court should have jurisdiction, because, despite the frequent political pressures in public
sector labor relations, those pressures are likely to have no substantial effect on any court.188 Indeed, such pressures are far less
likely to affect courts than they are to affect other governmental
bodies. 189 In any event, the possibility that political pressures might
186. See Michigan Report, supra note 84, at 15.
187. The flexibility of disposition possible in a local court was recently illustrated
in an action brought against striking teachers by the Board of Education in Plymouth,
Michigan. Plymouth Community School Dist. v. Adas, No. 4381 (Mich. Cir. Ct. for
Washtenaw County, filed Sept. 18, 1969). The Plymouth Board of Education presented
a prima fade case of "irreparable harm" by alleging that a consequence of continuing the strike would be the loss of state aid. But since the Board had sued the individual teachers rather than their organization, the court may have felt that granting
the relief requested would have gone counter to traditional judicial reluctance to
grant specific performance in situations involving personal services employment. The
court evaded the dilemma by, in effect, ordering the parties to settle. After two days
of enforced bargaining in chambers, the parties reached agreement, and the strike was
terminated. It is doubtful that an equally desirable result could have been obtained
under a more distant and perhaps more specialized and inflexible court.
188. When a judge is elected, for example, his term of office tends to be quite
long, thereby reducing the probability of adverse political consequences from any
single decision. Moreover, he may have a large enough constituency to be able to
avoid identification with the local government or with a single group of public employees. See note 189 infra.
189. Not only does a judge have a longer term, but his constituency may differ
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influence the decision of a local court can be minimized by the
statutory provision of standards to govern the issuance of an injunction. A court's failure to consider the fact finder's report, for
example, could furnish grounds for appellate reversal. By thus circumscribing the discretion of the local court, the statute can help
to ensure that the issuance of injunctions will not impair the goal of
effective bargaining. The statute might further require that the
court make written findings in support of its decision. Such a requirement would be an aid in supervising local courts and in
encouraging their compliance with statutory standards.
Although the courts must aid in the administration of a comprehensive approach to bargaining in the public sector, the public
agency probably plays an even more crucial role, and consequently
the nature of control over that agency is of fundamental importance.
Should the agency be independent or should it be subject to political control? On the one hand, independent regulatory agencies
are ·widely believed to be subject to capture by those whom they
regulate.190 But on the other hand, if the body were subject to
direct political control, it might become controlled by a partisan
political group.
The possibility that an independent body would be captured by
interested parties seems unlikely in the field of public employment.
As some have argued, the capture of regulatory agencies is usually
made with the approval of the political authority, 191 and such approval would probably not be given in the public sector, since capture
by employee interests would be in opposition to the political authority and capture by the political authority or the government
itself would immediately destroy the credibility and effectiveness of
the entire scheme. Moreover, even if capture can be a significant
danger, it is less likely to occur in an agency which regulates more
than one interest. Finally, if the members of a public employment
relations board are properly chosen, neither management nor labor
should have a monopoly on representation.
The extent to which there should be political control of the
agency is a difficult question in light of the inherent political assignificantly from that of a governmental executive. For instance, a judge may be
elected from a county constituency rather than from a single municipality. As a result,
a judge is not as likely as is a member of the government to be identified with the
public employer, nor is he as likely to be vulnerable to the pressures of a single em•
ployee group.
190. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
155 (1955). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LA.w TREATISE § 1.03 (1958), and citations
therein.
191. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LA.w TREATISE § 1.03 (1958); Jaffe, The Effective
Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1105-35 (1954).
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pects of public employment.192 Dangers of control by local governments or their employees can be minimized if establishment of the
agency is on the state level. The problem of political control of the
agency at that level by outstate interests unfriendly to labor does
not seem to be a realistic possibility, because a state that is able to
enact a public employee bargaining law in the first place is probably not so thoroughly controlled by antilabor interests that the
agency would fall under their power. Finally, the danger that the
state government might establish an agency simply to serve its own
interests should be mitigated by the realization that such an agency,
without apparent independence and objectivity, would be useless.
It thus appears that neither the threat of domination by special
interests nor political control would present a substantial danger to
the impartiality of a regulatory agency. Other considerations, however, militate in favor of a degree of independence. One of the
purposes of resorting to a state regulatory body is consistency of
administration, and that objective might be frustrated if the agency
were subject to extensive personnel changes following each election. Moreover, the appearance of being divorced from politics
would greatly enhance the bargaining parties' respect for the
agency's decisions. Such independence could be achieved by the
device of relatively long and staggered terms for members and by
the imposition of statutory limitations on the representation of a
single political party.19s
Despite the many benefits of a comprehensive plan for public
sector labor relations, however, there are inherent limitations upon
what can be accomplished under that type of plan. A bargaining
scheme is basically a method for institutionalizing dispute resolution, and the nature of public employment ensures that some disputes simply will not be susceptible to such resolution. It is difficult
to imagine, for example, that the New York City school decentralization dispute could have been settled through an established comprehensive plan. Moreover, to the extent that bargaining itself is confined by limitations on state governmental powers and finances,
political recourse will inevitably be necessary when those limits are
reached.1114 Disputes with such great political dimensions probably
can be resolved only by an ad hoc legislative disposition; and for
that reason, it seems futile to attempt to deal with them in a general
bargaining scheme whose goal should be to establish procedures by
which ordinary public sector labor disputes can be resolved.
192. See text following note 68 supra.
193. The New York PERB is structured in this manner. N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw
§ 205(1) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
194. See notes 121, 143 supra and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Attempts to achieve reasonable and equitable settlements of
employment disputes in the public sector continue to be plagued
by two conflicting approaches to the problem of strike prevention.
One seeks this goal through outright prohibition, while the other
strives to avoid strikes by promoting collective bargaining on the
private sector model. Neither approach by itself is satisfactory, existing combinations of the two provide little help, for they seemingly
attempt to apply each approach without regard for the effects of the
other. It seems likely that if the seemingly irreconcilable goals of
strike prohibition and equitable collective bargaining are to be
achieved, it will be through a planned blending of the two approaches. But the combination must aim toward neither the traditional punitive concept of strike prohibition nor adoption of the
private sector analogy for bargaining. Instead, the aim should be to
apply a variety of methods selectively with a view toward effectuating
an approximate balance of the bargaining power. The Michigan Supreme Court in Holland has moved in that direction by making the
issuance of injunctive relief dependent upon equitable considerations and by attempting to encourage resolution of disputes at the
bargaining stage.195 Nevertheless, courts are limited in this regard;
and the effectiveness of such decisions is hampered by the absence
of adequate legislation to regulate and encourage collective bargaining.
The desired balance of bargaining power can be promoted with
a variety of techniques. But the effectiveness of each depends upon
the circumstances in which it operates and upon the other techniques
with which it is combined. If bargaining power is to be effectively
balanced, there must be integration of techniques toward a common
goal, rather than the present bifurcation in which bargaining aids
such as mediation and fact-finding are applied in an attempt to
emulate labor relations of the private sector, while, at the same time,
fines and penalties are used indiscriminately for punishment. Undoubtedly, no single approach will be satisfactory for all states,
since the factors influencing bargaining power vary so widely. But
if the diverse goals of strike prevention, effective collective bargaining, and equitable settlements are to be attained in the public sector, where the militancy of employees is ever-increasing, continued
efforts to develop a workable approach are imperative.
195. 380 Mich. 314, 327, 157 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1968).

